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than just a historical artifact. Rather, the principle embedded
in waste doctrine underpins a great deal of property law generally, both common law and statutory, as well as the law governing oil and gas, water, and public trust resources. Seen for
what it is, waste doctrine provides a fresh perspective on property, natural resources, and environmental law.
In this Article, we excavate the old waste cases in multiple
fields of property and natural resources law to make novel
connections across these fields and demonstrate the doctrine’s
continuing relevance for contemporary lawyers, legal theorists, and environmental advocates. The Article is unique in
its articulation of a universal “waste principle” and its examination of how this principle facilitates communication and
cooperative self-governance by and among owners of common
property. It suggests that underenforcement of civil and administrative waste law in the context of common pool natural
resources contributes to failures in modern law to respond to
pressing environmental challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
Often presented as a minor component of a fossilized common law of property, the doctrine of waste embodies a timeless
but underacknowledged principle of conservation that sheds
light on contemporary issues in property, natural resources,
public trust, and environmental law. These diverse fields are animated by the fundamental challenge of managing the use, conservation, and preservation of common resources like land, oil,
water, and air. Stretching back to the early common law, the law
in these areas has adhered to a consistent principle to solve problems of common ownership—the “waste principle.” Understanding this principle illuminates the connections among these bodies of law and the relationship between private ownership and
public regulation.
This Article unearths the waste principle as a foundational,
though long-neglected, concept of American law. By unpacking
waste cases across various doctrines, the Article demonstrates
that the principle is an integral component of a liberal system of
natural resources and environmental governance. The principle
furnishes a common law antidote to current problems like regulating the atmosphere, curtailing natural gas venting and flaring, and addressing contamination by unregulated pollutants. In
contrast to the current body of administrative environmental
law, which is subject to fragmentation, obsolescence, and political instability, the waste principle is poised to address those
problems head-on. If given effect in practice, the waste principle
could provide a simple and powerful supplement to regulation to
help manage pressing issues regarding resource allocation, overuse, and environmental degradation.
The waste1 principle holds that the law should prohibit negative-sum (or “wasteful”) uses of property to the extent that the
self-interest of the owner or owners cannot be expected to systematically produce this result in the absence of any legal restriction.2 Negative-sum uses of common property are those that
produce fewer gains to the user than losses in welfare or net utility to other common owners (“commoners” or “common
1. The “waste” discussed in this Article pertains to the subtractive use of
shared assets and not to negative-value goods or worthless byproducts like nuclear
waste.
2. Nuisance doctrine and public law operate as external governance mechanisms to limit externalities that the owner’s use imposes on third parties; a fee
owner of wasted property suffers its own sins.
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owners”).3 When resources are held as common property,
whether among a small or a vast group of claimants, the waste
principle forbids uses that reduce the property’s total net utility
to the commoners as a group.4 As such, doctrines prohibiting
waste provide a mechanism for internal governance by limiting
the negative externalities that common owners may impose
upon each other. When the principle is violated, the law provides
legal and equitable remedies that require the defendant to incur
the costs of losses to utility or to curtail excessive use of the resource. This basic underlying function of waste law constrains
the self-interests of current owners, preserving reciprocal obligations regarding the use of property and preventing senseless
losses to co-owners and the public alike.
Articulating a consistent formulation of what constitutes
“waste” is difficult because it manifests in a broad array of legal
contexts across contract, property, corporate, trust, and public
law. Few scholars have devoted careful attention to the details
of the doctrine’s different manifestations.5 Instead, scholars
have unpacked the waste doctrine within single fields of property law, such as life estates and leasehold interests,6 oil and gas
law,7 water law,8 and the common law right to destroy private
property.9 On their surface, these doctrines may appear to share
3. Richard Posner has observed this basic function of waste in the life tenant–
remainder context. Richard A. Posner, Comment on Merrill on the Law of Waste, 94
MARQ. L. REV. 1095 (2011).
4. Although often considered in economic terms, the concept of utility within
the waste principle conveys an appropriately vague notion of satisfaction that embraces both evolving social values regarding conservation and resource use as well
as traditional, quantifiable economic values.
5. Notable exceptions include Jill M. Fraley, A New History of Waste Law: How
a Misunderstood Doctrine Shaped Ideas About the Transformation of Law, 100
MARQ. L. REV. 861 (2017); Michael Pappas, Anti-Waste, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 741 (2014).
While prominent scholars have used certain waste doctrines as a lens through
which to view larger developments in American law, these studies do not engage in
a multi-field analysis. See Fraley, supra; see also Jedediah Purdy, The American
Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
653 (2006); Thomas Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste
in American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055 (2011).
6. See Posner, supra note 3.
7. E.g., George D. Schrader, Oil and Gas—Waste of Oil and Gas as Between
Adjacent Landowners, 44 KY. L.J. 118 (1955).
8. E.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Legacy of Shodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water
Company: The Evolving Reasonable Appropriation Principle, 42 ENV’T L. 37 (2012);
Steven J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L.
REV. 483 (1982).
9. E.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 787
(2005).
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nothing but a name. Undeniably, each carries the unique gout
de terroir of its legal context. Viewed together, however, these
doctrines are bound by a common purpose—the conservation
and governance of commonly owned resources by disincentivizing negative-sum uses, consistent with the waste principle—
which is apparent only when they are studied together.
Examining waste across its various iterations reveals that
common law prohibitions against waste are strongest where
common property results from operation of law or because of the
natural physical attributes of the resource. Conversely, such
waste prohibitions are weaker where common ownership arises
voluntarily through grant or contract. For this reason, the waste
principle is also embedded in the public-trust doctrine.10 In each
of these contexts, the judicial doctrine of waste prevents monopolization and ensures all commoners a fair opportunity to access
and exploit the resource. Among private owners, this distributes
potential control equally among rights holders in a manner consistent with a liberal system of private property and self-governance, encouraging autonomy among individual owners except
where necessary to prevent the most egregious negative-sum
harms.
Moreover, as we encapsulate in Part V.A of the Article, a
contextualized analysis demonstrates that as resources become
scarcer or the number of commoners increases, common law
waste doctrine is often supplanted by provisions of contract and
public regulation, in part because statutory and contractual provisions tend to be more definite and easier to enforce. For resources with relatively few owners, such as land owned in concurrent or successive estates, owners frequently formalize their
relationships by contract (including by forming trusts and corporations to hold property), while legislatures sometimes also
adopt particularized statutes to enforce the vagaries of the judicial doctrine. Common pool natural resources follow a similar
arc. Growing demand tends to lead to greater and more particularized antiwaste regulation. Because common pool resources
are distributed widely among many owners, statutory and administrative regulation develop to overcome the coordination

10. The public-trust doctrine functions as a public-law analog to the privatelaw doctrine of waste by regulating the use of public trust resources, such as wet
sand beaches and submerged lands, which the public shares by virtue of their physical attributes.
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problems that stymie effective enforcement of judicial waste doctrine.
Uncovering the underlying principle reveals the theoretical
and normative significance of waste to the fields of property, natural resources, and environmental law. The waste principle constitutes an integral part of a liberal common law framework for
governing shared resources among owners and across time by
placing resource-use decisions principally in the hands of individual owners rather than in a centralized regulator.11 Conceptually, the principle creates an accountability mechanism
through which courts can remedy injuries and establish norms
and standards that are necessary to well-functioning and adaptive statutory and administrative systems. In practice, however,
courts often fail to effectively enforce waste doctrines, even when
they have been codified by statute, instead deferring to public
administration. This ignores waste as a useful, abstract legal
concept with applicability independent of its manifestations
within individual legal fields. Moreover, lack of enforcement
may contribute to the impression among courts, lawmakers, advocates, and scholars that advancements in law and technology
have rendered common law waste anachronistic and expendable
and that the most pressing and complex environmental issues
must be addressed solely through political processes.
On the contrary, disregard of the waste principle itself contributes to the failure of modern property theory and regulation
to address contemporary environmental problems. Absent consistent judicial enforcement of the waste principle, policymakers
and legal scholars have been quick to embrace statutory and regulatory solutions to commons and environmental issues. Environmental regulation has proliferated accordingly and, without
a flexible and generally applicable principle to guide it, has
taken on a fragmented, byzantine, and stultifying nature that is
itself prone to obsolescence. In short, the common law of waste
remains relevant, if forgotten. Faced with resource-scale problems, such as flaring and water contamination, its forward-looking perspective and unique function of allocating value to the
utility of natural resources to future users renders it essential.
Understanding waste law as a manifestation of a deeper principle of liberal self-governance is a necessary step toward
11. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549, 552–54 (2001) (describing liberal values in the context of commons property).
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reengaging common law courts in the cause of environmental
and natural resources management.
This study of waste law proceeds as follows. Part I surveys
the historical origins of the doctrine of waste. Part II delves into
waste’s manifestations in the fields of private property and concurrent and successive estates in land. Part III considers the operation of waste in inherently common pool natural resources
like oil, gas, and water. Part IV demonstrates the analogy between waste doctrine in the private-law context and the publictrust doctrine of public law. Part V summarizes the waste principle, connects it with leading contemporary liberal theories of
property, and highlights its potential contribution to environmental and natural resources management.
I.

THE WASTE PRINCIPLE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Since the colonial period, the concept of waste has been instrumental in shaping American law relative to both the acquisition of property and its governance between multiple owners.
Early commentators referred to undeveloped land in a colony or
territory as “waste and uncultivated territory.”12 Waste was
land left wild. Locke wrote of the “uncultivated waste of America” when referring to unused land that was disconnected from
commerce and had not been enclosed or put to commercial or
economic gain.13 Driven by an antiwaste ethos, the providential
settlement imperatives of the time took on the character of
12. E.g., JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 212 (John M. Gould
ed., 14th ed. 1896).
13. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 133 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689);
JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 76 (2015);
WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY
OF NEW ENGLAND 56 (Hill & Wang 2003) (1983). The dark corollary of this philosophy was that early settlers interpreted intermittent or seasonal possession as inadequate to establish title by possession and, based on these perceptions of spoilage
and underuse, colonialists and courts alike justified the dispossession and expropriation of native property. See Jill M. Fraley, Climate Change, Sustainability, and
the Failure of Modern Property Theory, 104 MARQ. L. REV. 93, 108–11 (2020) (discussing Carol Rose, John Locke, and the value of “speaking clearly and distinctly
about one’s claims to property” while also noting antiwaste bias in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)); STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND:
LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 21–22 (2007) (citing Robert Cushman, Reasons
and Considerations Touching the Lawfulness of Removing out of England into the
Parts of America, in A RELATION OR JOURNAL OF THE BEGINNING AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGLISH PLANTATION SETTLED AT PLIMOTH (Dwight B.
Heath ed., Corinth Books 1963) (1622)).
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religious fervor.14 Transformation of land from wilderness to
garden was perceived as “divinely ordained and wholly positive.”15 Unsurprisingly, policymakers of this era favored rules
incentivizing development and structuring ownership of resources based on development of markets and productive use.
These rules shared a common bias that unallocated and undeveloped resources should be possessed and developed for the
highest economic good.16
Concurrently, waste law also operated as a fundamental
limitation on the scope of property, limiting rights of possession
and appropriation relative to other claimants and prohibiting
negative-sum uses among owners of shared property. While the
failure to use land could be considered waste, so could its inefficient or purposeless use to the detriment of others. Here, too,
Locke wrote that allowing property to go to waste by using or
taking more than could be efficiently used “offended against the
common law of nature” and “invaded his neighbor’s share.”17 In
this respect, the law of waste stood athwart cultural norms of
development. While applying minimally to property held in undivided fee ownership, it largely constrained a tenant’s self-interest in exhausting resources and changing the use of divided
property. Although tenants were permitted customary estovers
necessary to the enjoyment of the land, the early American law
of waste, like its English counterpart, required preservation of
natural resources on divided property.18 Thus, waste doctrine
ran contrary to deliberate public policies of frontier economics,
which were designed to encourage timber clearing and mineral
extraction. Instead, waste manifested as rules requiring reasonable use and good husbandry.19 This same concept has been woven into legal doctrines across a variety of areas, among them

14. PURDY, supra note 13, at 154–55.
15. CRONON, supra note 13, at 5.
16. Id. While Locke noted that the appropriate right in common property was
limited to the extent that there was “enough, and as good” left for others, the perception in frontier economics that the “free gifts of nature” were unlimited largely
obscured this concept in early American history. Susan P. Liebell, The Text and
Context of “Enough and as Good”: John Locke as the Foundation of an Environmental Liberalism, 43 POLITY 210, 217 (2011); see also J.S. Furnivall, Land as a Free
Gift of Nature, 19 ECON. J. 552 (1909).
17. LOCKE, supra note 13, at 140.
18. See infra Section II.B.2.
19. See infra Section II.B.2.
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contracts,20 land titles,21 lost and mislaid property,22 adverse
possession,23 fiduciary duties,24 and game hunting.25
Waste law has evolved in response to dynamic changes in
perspective regarding value and utility, though its mechanisms
of civil law and public administration remain constant. As resources grew scarcer, courts and legislatures relied on waste’s
utilitarian and efficiency attributes to limit the fruitless or inefficient exhaustion of resources. Progressives in the conservation
movement recast waste as “any system or process that failed to
get the most value from its materials, whether those were minerals, trees, or human bodies and energy.”26 A flurry of new laws
and policies relating to water, oil and gas, timber, wildlife, and
rangelands followed.27 These laws endeavored to protect the individual “frontier” spirit and entrepreneurship of smallholders
by balancing capture-based property rules with scientific management. As ecological understanding of resources and the environment has deepened, legislatures and courts have reframed
waste law to consider the social utility of ecological and natural
resources to further stewardship and sustainability.28 Courts
and regulators increasingly apply regulatory schemes set up
during the conservation movement toward keeping water in its
channels and oil and gas in the ground for the sake of environmental preservation.29
Through this Article’s survey of waste law’s applications
across property law, a picture emerges of a consistent “waste
principle” that incorporates both public and private elements.
20. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 889 (N.Y. 1921).
21. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33
J.L. & ECON. 177, 177–97 (1990).
22. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 44
(2004).
23. Id. at 73.
24. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-246 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30
(1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-108-401 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-338 (1997); 805
ILL. COMP STAT. 180/15-3 (1998).
25. ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 11224 (2007); TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE § 62.011
(West 1975); ALASKA STAT. § 16.30.010 (1949).
26. PURDY, supra note 13, at 164.
27. See discussion infra at Sections III.A.2 and III.B.2.
28. Fraley, supra note 5, at 864; James P. Karp, A Private Property Duty of
Stewardship: Changing Our Land Ethic, 23 ENV’T L. 735, 749 (1993).
29. See infra notes 224–230 and accompanying text (discussing instream-flow
regulation); infra notes 169–171 and accompanying text (discussing amendments
to the definition of waste in Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act); Bryan Leonard, et al., Allow “Nonuse Rights” to Conserve Natural Resources, 373 SCIENCE 958
(2021).
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While not a rule of value maximization, waste doctrine imposes
obligations of stewardship and good husbandry by limiting
value-destroying and purposeless use. It is an outer bound on
the right to use property, which ties together the fates of shortand long-term interest holders and clarifies the decision-making
authority between them. By providing an accountability mechanism through the courts, waste encourages cooperation and selfgovernance through contract by constraining indifference. In
common pool resources, such as oil and gas and water, it inherently limits the scope of the property interest by preventing overuse that would block other commoners from enjoying their share.
As the scale of a shared resource or the social importance of its
common nature increases, waste doctrine operates increasingly
in conjunction with public regulation and administration to resolve problems among divergent interests and account for evolving concepts of utility based on changing values and technologies.
II. WASTE AND LAND LAW
In land law, the waste principle has evolved to limit the use
of real property across several ownership contexts. This Part examines the principle across those contexts in turn. First, Section
II.A examines how the waste principle may limit the generally
broad rights of single owners to waste their property when doing
so would arbitrarily deprive the public of the property’s cultural
value. Likewise, the waste principle may prevent concurrent
property owners from wasting their property when doing so
would prevent co-owners from enjoying the benefits of the land.
Section II.B examines limitations on concurrent and successive
landowners in turn. Section II.C describes these common law
doctrines as a component of the modern governance of waste
among owners of divided property and details their incorporation into statutory supplementation of common law rules.
A. Waste as a Limitation on the Single Owner’s Right to
Destroy Private Property
The role of the waste principle is to limit negative-sum30
uses of property when the owner’s self-interest cannot be
30. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
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expected to systematically produce this result. While most often
applied to protect the rights of other owners in shared property
or a common resource, in rare cases, waste may operate to limit
the right of an individual owner in order to prevent net losses to
society. This is perhaps most apparent where waste limits the
right of a single owner to have her property destroyed post-mortem.
Ownership of property generally includes the right to destroy it for any reason or no reason at all.31 Some modern precedents, however, have chipped away at the right to destroy
based on a public policy forbidding waste.32 In narrow and infrequent cases, courts have enjoined the executor of a decedent’s
estate from destroying property of the estate according to instructions in the will. In Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., the
court held that a testamentary instruction to destroy the decedent’s home in an “area of high architectural significance” violated public policy.33 Noting that “[n]o benefits are present to
balance against this injury,”34 the court wrote that “[a] well-ordered society cannot tolerate the waste and destruction of resources when such acts directly affect important interests of
other members of that society.”35 Compare Eyerman with National City Bank v. Case Western Reserve University, another
case involving a will wherein the decedent instructed the executor to destroy a historically and architecturally unique

31. Under Roman law, property rights consisted of the jus utendi, fruendi, et
abutendi—the rights to use the property, to enjoy its income, and to completely
consume or destroy it. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787–88. American law incorporated jus abutendi as the “right to destroy.” Id.; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223–24 (4th ed., 1770) (“If a man be the
absolute tenant in fee-simple . . . he may commit whatever waste his own indiscretion may prompt him to, without being impeachable or accountable for it to anyone.”
(emphasis added)); see Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic
Thought, 25 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 993, 997 (1939).
32. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 796–821 (discussing modern
legal limitations on the destruction of property, including the property of decedents’
estates).
33. Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
34. Id.
35. Id.; see Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (holding invalid
as against public policy a testator’s “capricious” direction to demolish two houses);
see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Rice Cnty. v. Scott, 93 N.W. 109, 109 (Minn. 1903)
(“We assume, for the purpose of this decision, that the direction in the codicil to the
executor to destroy all of the residue of the money or cash or evidences of credit
belonging to the estate was void.”).
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property.36 Unlike in Eyerman, however, the decedent’s longtime attorney testified that the decedent wanted the house razed
because it was sentimentally important to her, and she did not
want it to be converted to commercial use.37 Distinguishing
Eyerman, the National City Bank court explained the instant
case “is not one involving an unexplained testamentary direction
to destroy” and upheld the decedent’s will.38
While scholars have explained why some assets may or may
not be destroyed based on the magnitude of positive externalities
they produce for third parties,39 Eyerman and National City
Bank cannot be distinguished from one another on this basis—
both houses apparently produced significant positive externalities for the community. Whereas the Eyerman plaintiff ordered
her property destroyed for no reason at all, the National City
Bank plaintiff sought to protect her sentimental interests in the
property. That interest, regardless of whether it outweighed the
losses of destruction, was sufficient to preserve the owner’s right
to destroy. Rather than limiting only grossly harmful destruction of property, waste limits purposeless destruction of private
property of any magnitude by owners.40 In sum, the doctrine or
public policy of waste ensures some beneficial purpose to the destruction of private property when such a purpose cannot be presumed because the owner will not internalize the resulting
losses.
Governments have adopted historic-preservation statutes
as a public-law complement to waste.41 In addition to state and
federal registry laws identifying historic properties,42 state statutes also empower local governmental bodies to limit destruction
or substantial modification of properties with significant
36. Nat’l City Bank v. Case W. Rsrv. Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1976).
37. Id. at 816–17.
38. Id. at 818.
39. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 822 (“Where a structure retains genuine
historical or architectural value and has been landmarked through the ordinary
processes, destruction is plainly undesirable.”); JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS
WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 9–10
(1999) (arguing that the cultural value of fine art, architecture, important papers,
and antiquities precludes their destruction); Pappas, supra note 5, at 765–66 (justifying anti-destruction limitations based on the importance of certain property to
the dignity of a community).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1959).
41. See Paul E. Wilson & H. James Winkler, The Response of State Legislation
to Historic Preservation, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 329, 330–31, 339–40 (1971).
42. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1981); RI STAT. § 42-45-5 (West 2021).
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historical and architectural values.43 Designation of property as
a landmark under such a law generally prohibits its present and
future owners from destroying or materially altering it, either
by inter vivos or testamentary act.44 Such laws go beyond merely
codifying the policy against waste: they impose stricter limits on
private rights of ownership in a specific building, often in addition to zoning and historic-district laws generally applicable to
property in the area.45
As particular property grows in social importance, the likelihood that regulatory provisions will be adopted to preserve it
from destruction also grows. At a critical point, the owner’s private interest in the property yields to the public’s interest, as
expressed by legislation, subject to the protections of due process
and the Takings Clause.46 While historic-preservation laws embody and complement the waste principle with respect to a narrow set of social values, they do not obviate the common law role
of waste regarding destruction of property. The waste principle
more broadly permits courts to consider a range of disparate values on a case-by-case basis to determine the precise set of circumstances in which the public interest could outweigh an
owner’s right to destroy.
B. Waste Between Concurrent and Successive Interests
Beyond its very limited application in the single-owner context, the doctrine of waste is central to governing the relationships between concurrent and successive owners of property.
Fragmentation of property, whether vertical, horizontal, or temporal, creates incentives for inefficient use.47 Accordingly,
whereas a fee owner enjoys the right to waste property, fragmentation of the interest gives rise to an implied obligation to
43. See, e.g., IN. CODE ANN. § 36-7-11-10 (West 2021); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE Ch. 3, §§ 25-301 to 25-321 (West 1985).
44. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE art. XVII, § 2-120-580(1) (1987). Tracking
the doctrine of permissive waste, some historic-preservation laws may additionally
include affirmative maintenance obligations to prevent demolition by neglect. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-400.14(b) (2006); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516
F.2d 1051, 1066–67 (5th Cir. 1975).
45. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
46. In some limited cases, members of the public may have standing to challenge administrative approvals to destroy or modify historic property where they
can demonstrate injury greater than that to the public at large. See Allison v. N.Y.C.
Landmarks Pres. Comm’n, 944 N.Y.S.2d 408, 412 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
47. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (4th ed. 1994).
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preserve the fee.48 The doctrine of waste evolved to reconcile divergent interests by requiring parties in possession to manage
the property “as if [they] were the [single] owner.”49 It protects
rights and prevents ignored responsibilities so that no owner can
deprive the others of productive elements of the property. This
Section analyzes common law and statutory waste claims between two classes of owners of divided interests: (1) cotenants
and (2) life tenants and remaindermen.
1. Concurrent Interests
Regardless of their percentage of ownership, the common
law of most states provides that cotenants in land each possess
an equal right to reasonably use and occupy the property as necessary to enjoy the benefit and value of ownership.50 The common law protects the right of one or more cotenants to unilaterally use the shared property without the consent of their fellow
owners, except where the use would result in ouster or waste.51
In most cases, however, there is no action for waste where one
cotenant uses more than its proportionate share. Instead, a cotenant in possession owes an accounting to other owners for
their share of profits.52 Even disproportionate use is not waste.
Waste requires something more egregious: behavior that exceeds the scale of use expected for the property to such an extent
that it unreasonably diminishes the fair rights of use by other
owners.

48. MARSHALL DEES HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES 10 (1953).
49. POSNER, supra note 47, at 73. Whereas a single owner’s self-interest most
often aligns with preserving long-term value, where property is shared either successively or concurrently, each individual owner may be motivated to extract maximal value for itself to the detriment of others. Thus, waste law intervenes more
forcibly to prevent inefficiencies in the concurrent/successive interest than it does
where an owner has an undivided fee. See discussion accompanying infra notes 68–
72.
50. See Morga v. Friedlander, 680 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Spiller
v. Mackereth, 334 So. 2d 859, 862 (Ala. 1976).
51. See Morga, 680 P.2d at 1270; Spiller, 334 So. 2d at 862; Jasper Land Co. v.
Manchester Sawmills, 96 So. 417, 419 (Ala. 1923).
52. See Collins v. Jackson, 517 N.E.2d 269 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Williams v.
Bruton, 113 S.E. 319 (S.C. 1922); Darden v. Cowper, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 210 (N.C.
1859).
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Whether a use of property constitutes waste depends on the
nature of the property interest.53 What a court considers waste
for one estate, it may consider reasonable use for another. For
instance, because a mineral estate “can only be enjoyed by removing the products thereof”54 under the common law, one mineral cotenant could not sue another for waste resulting from production of the minerals.55 In cases regarding coal,56 oil and
gas,57 timber lands,58 and mining,59 courts have considered extraction and sale of natural resources to be the “use [rather] than
the destruction of the estate.”60 Use consistent with the nature
of the property does not make a cotenant a tortfeasor.61 Instead,
a cotenant making unilateral use of property is liable to the
other cotenants for “what he has received in excess of his just
proportion.”62
While the law protects cotenants’ rights of use, it prohibits
that which injures or destroys. A cotenant may not unilaterally
use the property in a manner that diminishes its utility to other
common owners.63 To do so would permit one owner to monopolize the property at the expense of the others. For instance,
waste may prohibit a cotenant in fee from cutting all the standing timber on shared property.64 Although cutting timber for use
on a farm may be consistent with use and enjoyment of property,
denuding the land entirely is “destructive . . . of the value of the

53. See 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 5.3
(1987).
54. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1924). But see Law
v. Heck Oil Co., 145 S.E. 601 (W. Va. 1928).
55. Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305 (Va. 1988); Elwell v. Burnside, 44
Barb. 447 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1865).
56. See, e.g., Karst-Robbins Coal Co. v. Arch of Ky., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 419 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1997).
57. See, e.g., Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2020).
58. See, e.g., Quigley Furniture Co. v. Rhea, 76 S.E. 330 (Va. 1912).
59. See, e.g., Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920
(N.Y. 1987).
60. McCord v. Oakland Quicksilver Mining Co., 27 P. 863, 865 (Cal. 1883).
61. Neel v. Neel, 19 Pa. 323 (1852); Sanders v. Robertson, 57 Ala. 465, 471
(1876); Morga v. Friedlander, 680 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
62. McGahan v. Nat’l Bank of Rondout, 156 U.S. 218, 236 (1895) (internal citations omitted).
63. Woods v. Early, 28 S.E. 374, 376 (Va. 1897); Jasper Land Co. v. Manchester
Sawmills, 96 So. 417, 419 (Ala. 1923).
64. Murray v. Fowler, 88 So. 849 (Ala. 1921); Hardman v. Brown, 88 S.E. 1016
(W. Va. 1916).
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estate, and not consistent with a prudent enjoyment by the real
owner[s].”65
2. Successive Estates and Future Interests
The most studied iteration of the waste doctrine protects future interests by limiting a present possessory tenant’s use of
land. It governs the relationship between life tenants and reversioners or remaindermen.66 This doctrine “forbids the tenant for
life from permanently diminishing the property value by acting
contrary to how a reasonably prudent person would act to preserve his own property.”67 Owners of present and future interests in property often have divergent economic interests.68 A life
tenant may engage in short-term thinking and profit-maximizing behavior; the remainderman hopes to maximize the property’s long-term value. Successive and future estates may be created by contract (e.g., leases), where it is relatively easy for
parties to negotiate management of the property, or by testamentary devise69 or operation of law.70 In the latter cases, it is
more difficult for the parties to contract for common management, particularly if future interests are held by children or the
unborn.71 The doctrine of waste developed to address these
65. Hawley v. Clowes, 2 Johns. Ch. 122, 123 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
66. When referring to future interests, we use reversion and remainder interchangeably. Although at common law the doctrine of waste did not extend to contractual relationships between tenants and landlords, or mortgagees and mortgagors, courts and statutes have since extended the right to sue for waste to these other
classes of successive interests, though the remedies available may be more limited.
See George W. Kirchwey, Liability for Waste. I. At Common Law, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 425 (1908); Jill M. Fraley, Modern Waste Law, Bankruptcy, and Residential
Mortgages, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 485, 488–89 (2019); Malone & Foote v. Marriott, 64
Ala. 486, 493 (1879); Marsha Baumgarner & Michael Hentrel, What a Waste!
What’s a Prudent Lender to Do?, 5 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM. U.) 10 (2008).
67. Reel v. Reel, 23 N.E.3d 309, 312 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). The doctrine is
deeply rooted in the Roman law of usufructs and the English common law, originating in the Magna Carta and chivalry statutes, which later carried over to early
American law. For an overview of the origins of waste law, see Sally Brown Richardson, Reframing Ameliorative Waste, 65 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 335, 341 (2017); Paul
Babie, Magna Carta and the Forest Charter: Two Stories of Property, 94 N.C. L.
REV. 1431, 1454 (2016); WILLIAM CRUISE, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 67 (1804); Note, Recent Cases – Waste – Permissive
Waste – Whether Tenant for Years Liable for Treble Damages, 22 HARV. L. REV. 140,
149 (1908).
68. POSNER, supra note 47, at 73–74.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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inefficiencies.72 In this area, there are three kinds of actionable
waste: (1) voluntary, (2) permissive, and (3) ameliorative.73 Collectively, the cases between current and successive owners reflect a standard that favors reasonable use consistent with evolving customs of good husbandry but enforces a limitation against
selfish uses that unreasonably diminish the values and expectations of other owners.
a. Voluntary and Permissive Waste
Waste among successive-interest owners may result from either misfeasance or nonfeasance.74 “Voluntary waste is willful
waste”—that is, misfeasance.75 American courts generally apply
a good-husbandry standard to determine whether use of property constitutes voluntary waste. This standard balances the
present owners’ rights of use and enjoyment, on one hand, and
the future owners’ interest in the inheritance on the other. For
instance, in Jackson v. Brownson, the court announced that a
tenant would have the right to “fell part of the timber, so as to
fit the land for cultivation.”76 However, where the tenant destroyed “nearly all the wood on the demised premises” such that
the property would be unable to sustain the needs of future interest holders to maintain its buildings, the court found the extensive clearing to be an unreasonable injury to the inheritance.77 Similarly, the court in Livingston v. Reynolds enjoined
a tenant’s use of timber and clay for commercial brickmaking
where the purpose of the tenancy was limited to “use of the
farm.”78 Noting that use of wood and soil for brick-bote to supply
the farm would be “reasonable and customary estovers” to which
the tenant was entitled, the court held that converting the property to a commercial brickyard offended the idea of good husbandry among “even the most irregular and slovenly cultivators”
and amounted to waste.79 As these cases recognize, a tenant may

72. John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV.
1209, 1229 (2007).
73. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1057; Recent Cases – Waste – Permissive Waste –
Whether Tenant for Years Liable for Treble Damages, supra note 67.
74. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1057.
75. Palmer v. Mossbarger, 27 N.E.3d 944, 948 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
76. Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns 227, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
77. Id. at 234.
78. Livingston v. Reynolds, 26 Wend. 115, 117–18 (N.Y. 1841).
79. Id. at 122.
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make reasonable use of natural resources consistent with the
purpose of the tenancy, but their complete exhaustion is waste.80
Consistent with this principal, voluntary waste restricts a
tenant’s use of nonrenewable resources except where the consumption of those resources is consistent with the nature of the
tenancy. The common law prohibits production of coal or oil and
gas by a life tenant without the consent of the remainder.81
Where, however, the grantor was extracting timber or minerals
before the creation of the life estate, the open-mine doctrine permits the tenant to continue the activity alone and without liability for waste.82 Thus, in Williard v. Williard, a life tenant did
not forfeit his estate by cutting timber because the court inferred
from the grantor’s own woodcutting that “timber was the intended source of profit” and was necessary to enjoyment of the
property.83 The open-mine exception, however, does not permit
the tenant to exceed the level of resource use that can be inferred
from the prior use of the grantor.
Where overuse may constitute waste, so can neglect. Permissive waste “arises from the neglect, omission, sufferance, or
permission of the tenant”—that is, culpable nonfeasance.84 To
establish liability for most forms of permissive waste, a future
interest must show that the life tenant’s actions or omissions
were “detrimental to the inheritance and contrary to the ordinary course of good husbandry”; if the change is one that “no
good farmer would make,” it is waste.85 Here, too, custom is critical to determining the obligation of a tenant to maintain the
property. In Clemence v. Steere, for example, the court considered both the customary “state of cultivation” in the region and
the condition of the property at the start of the tenancy to determine the life tenant’s duty to make repairs to “make [the property] tenantable.”86 The waste principle requires a tenant to act
80. In setting this standard, courts like Livingston often defer to local custom
regarding reasonable use, which was generally trusted to reflect a sustainable level
of resource use.
81. See, e.g., Sewell v. Sewell, 1 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill. 1936).
82. Reese v. Reese-Young, 938 N.W.2d 405, 410 (N.D. 2020).
83. Williard v. Williard, 56 Pa. 119, 128 (1867).
84. Palmer v. Mossbarger, 27 N.E.3d 944, 948 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (quoting
Reams v. Henney, 97 N.E.2d 37, 38 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950)). A classic example of permissive waste is the nonpayment of real property taxes, which saves a life tenant
the amount of the tax but imposes potentially devastating losses to the future interest, who could lose title as a consequence. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 1057.
85. Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272, 274 (1850).
86. Id. at 275–76.
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reasonably to maintain property to the extent that the value it
realizes through neglect is outweighed by the utility it could preserve through diligence.
Viewed through these early cases, the waste principle permits liberal use of property while also setting an outer bound
prohibiting profligate and unreasonable use.87 Embedded in the
principle is a standard of good husbandry. While not requiring
any improvement and generally permitting the present owner a
broad spectrum of self-governance, the waste principle demands
that present uses should not diminish future utility in a way
that produces net losses, whether through destruction, extraction, or neglect.
b. Ameliorative Waste and the American Rule
More complicated are situations where the present-interest
owner desires to change property in a way that increases its economic value to both itself and the reversioner. In these cases, the
present owner commits neither malfeasance nor nonfeasance.
Nonetheless, a third doctrine of waste, ameliorative waste, may
limit changes in the use of shared property that produce losses
in value or in utility to future users.88
The American doctrine of ameliorative waste can be understood through a tale of two mansions. These two cases posit
waste doctrine as a flexible standard that accounts for changing
circumstances, customs, and technological innovations in land
use. Rather than creating a static rule that elevates one value
over others—whether maximizing value or preserving property
in one form—American courts have applied waste doctrine as a
standard wherein multiple competing values and considerations
can be balanced among owners and across past, present, and future interests.
In Brokaw v. Fairchild, a life tenant sought to demolish an
ornate Fifth Avenue mansion in New York and convert it into an
apartment building.89 Despite acknowledging that the life tenant could make substantially more income if the property was
redeveloped and that the remaindermen were “selfish and
87. Karp, supra note 28, at 749.
88. See Fraley, supra note 5, at 864–65.
89. Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929). The life tenant demonstrated that renting the residence would not produce sufficient income to cover
taxes and maintenance. Id. at 9–11.
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unmindful” in their opposition, the court prohibited the change
on grounds of waste.90 It held that a drastic change in the property’s use constituted “an act of ownership and dominion” that
contradicted the rights of use granted by the tenancy and the
intent of the grantor to pass on “[his] residence.”91 Scholars of
the time derided the holding as “an impediment to progress.”92
Yet this reductive characterization misses the Brokaw court’s
point. Consistent with earlier English cases,93 the Brokaw court
did not find that change per se amounted to waste. Instead, it
holistically considered property as existing not only in its physical location as an economic commodity but also in relationship
to the grantor, the life tenant, and the reversioners. By prohibiting alterations to the mansion, the court demonstrated reverence for and allocated value to the grantor’s intention that the
remaindermen receive a specific thing, “[n]ot something else of
equivalent value.”94
Where property cannot be reasonably preserved, however,
waste does not require economically inefficient outcomes.95 In
another case involving an elaborate and outdated mansion, the
court in Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. permitted the life tenant to
destroy a mansion and convert the land to a higher value industrial use.96 Believing he owned fee simple, the life tenant destroyed a once-elegant mansion and graded the knoll where it
stood to street level. Industrial buildings and railroads had encroached so closely that the property was unsuitable for a residence, while the mansion made it also useless for business purposes. The court emphasized that where land had become
useless—such as a barren orchard or a grain field with no market for its crop—waste permitted a change of use and did not
require the tenant to preserve the property in a useless state
only to “turn it over to the reversioner, equally useless.”97 Rather
than reflecting an absolute preference for value-maximization

90. Id. at 14–15.
91. Id.
92. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1082–83.
93. See Fraley, supra note 66.
94. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1093.
95. See Lovett, supra note 72, at 1212.
96. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899).
97. Id. at 740. The court’s decision also limited economic waste where restoration of the property to a lower-value use would require the fruitless expenditure of
funds for no benefit. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 1075.
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and industrialization,98 however, Melms suggests that a tenant
may change the nature of property when doing so is consistent
with the principles of good husbandry that inform the doctrines
of voluntary and permissive waste.
The divergent outcomes in Brokaw and Melms have been
cited as marking the transformation of the law of ameliorative
waste consistent with the social and realist reform of property
law.99 However, both cases can be explained more simply as permitting alterations that do not decrease the property’s total utility to all its owners. Understanding ameliorative waste as either
always prohibiting or permitting change based on economic values alone is incorrect. Stasis has never been the rule. While it is
true that ameliorative waste has, at times, been applied to require preservation—for instance, requiring all or portions of forest to remain uncleared100 or prohibiting replacement of a structure with another of greater value101—other examples show that
the doctrine is flexible enough to permit progress. As in Brokaw
and Melms, these cases show a flexible and enduring standard
wherein courts consider multiple equities and values including,
among others, the character and nature of the property, customs
of the region, changes in technology, intent of the grantor, and
purposes of the tenancy.102 Read together with other cases
across a survey of waste law, ameliorative waste is not a novel
doctrine nor is it a transformed one, but rather an application of
the good-husbandry standard embedded within the waste principle to changing values and circumstances.
3. The Modern Governance of Waste in Divided
Property
Although the prevalence of common law waste actions
among owners of divided property has diminished, the principle
established through waste doctrine continues to operate as a
fundamental force in the governance of divided property. Legislatures have extended standing for waste to new classes of

98. See Purdy, supra note 5, at 692 (quoting Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. (11
Met.) 304, 312 (1846)).
99. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1080–84.
100. John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 534–36 (1996).
101. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1058.
102. See Fraley, supra note 5, at 864–65.
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divided interests—concurrent owners of property103 and mortgagees104—which were not protected from waste at common law.
States have also adopted statutes that incorporate aspects of the
common law of waste, for example, to clarify preexisting obligations between life tenants and remaindermen105 or to codify the
common law distribution of mineral development rights and royalty payments among present and future interest holders.106
These statutory modifications refine rather than overhaul
the waste principle. Even New York’s statute, often cited as abrogating Brokaw,107 preserves the common law rule’s deference
for the language in the granting instrument.108 While creating
a presumption in favor of changes that do not reduce market
value, the statute codifies the prudent-owner standard of the
waste principle and requires the life tenant to provide the future
owner with both notice of proposed repairs and security against
costs and risk of noncompletion.109 Rather than creating a carte
blanche in favor of redevelopment, the waste principle is thus
evident throughout the workings of the statute. It preserves the
judicial role in evaluating the prudence of proposed changes to
property and ensuring consistency with the intent of the grantor. Although statutes may modify common law rules for reasons
of public policy or efficiency, they neither eliminate the common
law doctrine of waste nor relegate it to obscurity. Instead, the
common law rules and statutes operate together to establish the
baseline rights and obligations of owners in divided property.
III. WASTE OF COMMON POOL NATURAL RESOURCES
The waste principle also molds the laws governing allocation and use of common pool natural resources. When natural
resources are held in common, whether by a discrete group or
the entire public, common owners tend to have co-equal rights
103. Morton Gitelman, The Impact of the Statute of Gloucester on the Development of the American Law of Waste, 39 ARK. L. REV. 669 (1986); Kirchwey, supra
note 66.
104. Fraley, supra note 66.
105. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-103 (West 1947); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
§ 69 (1910); IDAHO CODE § 55-311 (1919); 21 GUAM CODE ANN. § 11101 (2021); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.009 (West 1995).
106. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 303 (1995); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/10
(2019).
107. Merrill, supra note 5, at 1080.
108. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 803(c) (McKinney 1962).
109. See id.
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to exploit the resource on a first-come-first-served basis.110 Under such a rule, an owner may take from the common pool without liability to the other owners. Instead of a legal remedy, owners damaged by another commoner’s capture of the resource
have only the self-help remedy of capturing their own share.111
Under a pure rule of capture, all common pool natural resources
are susceptible to excessive use and premature exhaustion. Even
renewable natural resources, such as rivers, are rivalrous because one commoner’s use of the resource reduces its availability
to other owners.112 Because they can externalize the costs to the
other common pool owners while internalizing all the gains,
common pool owners tend to exploit the resource to exhaustion
at a “socially suboptimal” rate.113
To avoid premature depletion of the common pool in this
manner, extractions must be constrained by custom, contract, or
law.114 Waste doctrine serves this function by prohibiting negative-sum transactions in the common pool. While not directly
concerned with the distribution of benefits derived from a shared
resource,115 waste sets the floor for permissible uses of a common pool asset. As among concurrent owners of divided property,
waste bars actions that monopolize the common pool for an individual owner’s sole benefit by undermining the available supply
or quality of the resource or inflating the costs of its use.116 Resource monopolies create tremendous gain to the monopolist at

110. See Joseph A. Schremmer, Pore Space Property, 2021 UTAH L. REV. 1 (discussing the role of capture in oil and gas and water law).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Alan E. Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property
Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. REV. 855, 859 (1971).
114. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 ENV’T L. 1, 26–28 (1994); see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS 8–18 (1990) (discussing typical policy prescriptions, mostly centering on coercive legal regulation or privatization as alternatives).
115. Other legal mechanisms, such as statutory and common law provisions
for correlative rights or reasonable use, may require equitable or proportional distribution of rights in the common pool. See Schremmer, supra note 110 (discussing
the doctrines of correlative rights and reasonable use as limitations on the absolute
rule of capture). The distribution of rights in public property, accordingly, is the
realm of constitutional equal protection, much as the public-trust doctrine is analogous to private-tlaw waste. See Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State
Dep’t of Nat. Res., 101 P.3d 891, 897 (Wash. 2004).
116. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENV’T L. 919, 964 (1998) (citing
VERNON A. MUND, MONOPOLY: A HISTORY AND THEORY 100 (1933)).
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the expense of diminishing the total net utility of the resource,
thus violating the waste principle.
Among common pool natural resources, public waste regulation often supplants the common law doctrine. Public regulation is costlier to administer than the judicial waste doctrine
and, thus, tends to arise when the resource becomes sufficiently
scarce and valuable to justify the costs of adopting, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing regulation. Much as the state
may exercise its police power to prevent common law nuisances,117 where there are many common owners and costs to
enforce common law prohibitions are high, the state is justified
in regulating common owners’ use of the pool ex ante to avoid
waste. Enforcing these private rights has a salutary effect on the
public interest by protecting the social and economic value of the
common pool resource from egregiously negative-sum uses.
Where merely enforcing private rights is insufficient to satisfy
the public interest, regulation may also limit private rights, subject to the requirements of due process and the Takings Clause.
The limitation on waste of common resources is derived
from the physical nature of the resource, which forces owners to
share.118 The resources examined here—oil and gas in Section
III.A and water in Section III.B—are shared due to their physical nature.119 They are fluid, migratory, and widely geographically distributed, heedless of property boundaries, and thus
subject to rivalrous, competing claims by numerous individuals,

117. Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 429, 479–87 (2004).
118. Some have bemoaned the simple fact that some resources are “owned in
common because there is no alternative!” OSTROM, supra note 114, at 3 (quoting
JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING
AND ECONOMICS 62 (1968)).
119. Contrast this with resources that are held in common only because of a
legislative policy choice, which are less susceptible to the limitation on waste inherent in the title to truly common resources. For instance, despite ecological and economic devastation resulting from overuse, courts refused to limit overgrazing on
the public rangelands. Yet Congress mandated public rangelands be held in common and, despite the excludable nature of rangeland, even enjoined attempts by
users to divvy up or regulate their use. See Gary Libecap, The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and
Resource Policy, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 257, 274 (2007); John S. Harbison, Hohfeld and
Herefords: The Concept of Property and the Law of the Range, 22 N.M. L. REV. 459,
467 (1992); George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of
Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Grazing Act, 13
ENV’T L. 1, 5 (1982); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 327–28 (1890); Healy v. Smith,
83 P. 583, 587 (Wyo. 1906); Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81, 85 (1894).

2022]

WASTE AND GOVERNANCE OF PROPERTY

633

often by virtue of owning appurtenant land.120 As such, they are
inherently nonexclusive.121 Variously called true commons,122
“limited common property,”123 or “semicommons,”124 in these resources, “elements of private and common property both coexist
and interact.”125 The property is held in common among the particular community of users “but exclusively vis-à-vis the outside
world.”126 Across these examples,127 common law waste law and
its statutory and administrative counterparts reinforce the
standard of good husbandry by limiting the ability of owners
within the community to engage in self-interested behavior that
diminishes the total value of the resource.
A. Waste in Oil and Gas Law
Oil and gas resources are a classic semicommons. They are
found in interconnected underground layers of porous and permeable rocks called “reservoirs.”128 Reservoirs often underlie
numerous individually owned tracts of land, the owners of which
enjoy rights in the oil and gas under the ad coelum doctrine.129
120. In the case of oil and gas and groundwater reservoirs, ownership in the
reservoir is determined by the ad coelum doctrine, which holds that ownership of
land includes ownership of all underlying materials. E.g., Stillwater Water Co. v.
Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 908 (Minn. 1903). For surface waters, rights in the water are
distributed among the owners of land appurtenant to the stream (“riparian” land)
or lake or shoreline (“littoral” land). E.g., Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 482
(Mich. 1967).
121. See Schremmer, supra note 110.
122. Carol M. Rose, Surprising Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1262
(2014).
123. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129,
132 (1999).
124. Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property
Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 445 (2008).
125. Id.
126. Rose, supra note 123, at 132.
127. Other examples abound, including fisheries, oceans, subterranean pore
space, and even the broadcast frequency spectrum.
128. Schremmer, supra note 110, at 7.
129. Id. at 8. Jurisdictions view the nature of a landowner’s property interest
in oil and gas differently. Some hold that oil and gas are corporeal real property to
which the owner has fee simple title, while others regard such rights to be incorporeal akin to a profit interest. 1 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203 (Matthew Bender & Co., LexisNexis 2020). Despite this conceptual difference, both types of jurisdictions view the waste doctrine
of oil and gas as impermissible. Compare Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d
558 (Tex. 1948) (holding waste to be actionable under a corporeal ownership theory), with McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co., 165 So. 632, 633 (La. 1936) (holding likewise
under an incorporeal theory).
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The rule of capture permits reservoir owners to produce oil or
gas from their tracts, even if it drains neighboring properties.130
Because reservoirs are interconnected, one owner’s production
necessarily affects the reserves and reservoir pressure available
to the other reservoir owners. Reflecting this physical interconnectedness, legal rights in common reservoirs are relative, or
“correlative,” rather than absolute. Accordingly, the right of capture comes with reciprocal duties to other owners in the common
reservoir.131 Tracking Locke’s principles of “enough and as good”
and “spoilage,” these duties are given effect in two common law
doctrines. The first is the correlative rights doctrine, which ensures that each reservoir owner has an equal opportunity to produce the reserves.132 The second doctrine is waste.
1. Common Law Waste of Oil and Gas
Waste doctrine is primarily concerned with not how much of
the reserves an owner produces but with how the production
changes the market or reservoir to the detriment of others.133
Oil and gas cases wherein courts have applied the waste doctrine
can be subdivided into two types: physical and economic waste.
Physical waste renders oil or gas unrecoverable due to accidental
destruction, intentional dissipation, or inefficient production
practices.134 Economic waste, in contrast, refers to the sale or
use of oil or gas that generates insufficient economic returns.135
A survey of oil and gas cases wherein the courts applied the
waste doctrine follows.
In 1948, Texon’s well in the Agua Dulce Field in Texas blew
out, destroying a neighbor’s well and causing significant quantities of oil and gas to blow into the air from the reservoir.136 In
the resulting case, Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., the court held
130. Schremmer, supra note 110.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See Commonwealth v. Trent, 77 S.W. 390 (Ky. 1903) (“To allow the storehouse of nature to be exhausted by the waste of the gas would be to deprive the
state and its citizens of many advantages incident to its use.”).
134. It includes both surface waste, such as venting and flaring of gas, and
underground waste, such as excessive production that causes channeling and ultimate loss of producible reserves. See 8 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER,
WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW, § W, at 1131–32.1 (Matthew Bender & Co.,
LexisNexis 2020).
135. Id.
136. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
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Texon liable for damages for negligent waste, despite that “substantially all of such waste or destruction occurred after the minerals had been drained from beneath” Elliff’s land.137 It reasoned that reservoir owners have the right to appropriate gas
and oil from the common reservoir, “even to the diminution or
exhaustion of the supply under his neighbor’s land,” but that
“the negligent waste and destruction of petitioner’s gas and distillate was neither a legitimate drainage of the minerals from
beneath [Texon’s] lands nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation
of them.”138 On remand, the Court of Civil Appeals permitted
Elliff to recover the value of the gas and distillate wrongfully
destroyed.139
Waste is therefore an exception to the privilege granted by
the rule of capture. In blowout cases like Elliff, courts limit the
rights of reservoir owners under the rule of capture to produce
the common reservoir only for beneficial purposes. The producing owner’s accidental destruction of the reservoir imposes
losses on the other common owners by reducing the quantity and
quality available to them with no offsetting benefit to the producer. Because the destruction of the reservoir results in a net
loss of utility to the common owners as a group, it violates the
waste principle.
Similarly, almost all courts exclude from the right of capture
intentional, purposeless dissipation of reserves.140 While the defendants in these cases often act out of spite, it is the generation
of losses without a benefit, rather than motive, that is determinative. For instance, in both Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co.141 and Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co.,142 the
defendants were clearly motivated by malice. The courts in those
cases, however, enjoined the activities not due to malice but
137. Id. at 560.
138. Id.
139. Texon Drilling Co. v. Elliff, 216 S.W. 2d 824, 829 (Tex. App. 1948).
140. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 129, § 204. In one oft-cited exception,
Hague v. Wheeler, the court permitted the defendant’s intentional dissipation when,
lacking access to market, the defendant flared gas from its well to leverage plaintiffs to share their market or pay an exorbitant price to shut in. Hague v. Wheeler,
27 A. 714 (Pa. 1893). Although Hague has been characterized as permitting waste,
it was actually resolved on the basis of the plaintiffs’ inequitable conduct in inducing the defendant to drill without a market, as demonstrated persuasively by David
E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oilpatch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to
Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN STATE ENV’T L. REV. 241, 258–59 (2011).
141. Louisville Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating Co., 77 S.W. 368, 369 (Ky. 1903) (noting
that the defendant sought to “cripple [plaintiff] as a rival”).
142. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guar. Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211–12 (La. 1919).
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rather because the plaintiffs could show no offsetting benefits to
justify damage to the reservoirs. The Louisville court explained
that “a man is only allowed to make a reasonable use of those
natural supplies which are for the common benefit of all.”143 In
contrast, in Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., the court declined to hold the
defendant liable, despite finding that the defendant maliciously
drilled wells along the plaintiff’s property line to drain the plaintiff’s reserves.144 Although the plaintiffs in each case suffered
the same kind of harm, the distinguishing fact is that the defendant in Kelley did not squander its production. Taken together, the accidental destruction and intentional dissipation
cases demonstrate an essential requirement of waste in the context of common pool resources: production from a common source
must be for a beneficial purpose.
Waste also dictates that production must generate enough
benefit to the producer to outweigh the losses it imposes on other
reservoir owners. As such, the doctrine proscribes production
practices that are extremely inefficient because they reduce ultimate recovery from the reservoir.145 For instance, in Manufacturers’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., the court
enjoined a defendant from using artificial pumps to produce its
wells based on the plaintiff’s assertion that the practice would
cause salt water to encroach prematurely and strand producible
gas. The court recognized a common law right to enjoin “any and
all acts of another owner which will materially injure, or which
will involve the destruction of the property in the common fund
or supply of gas.”146 The key factor in Manufacturers’ Gas was
not the technology employed by the defendant but rather its suitability to the particular reservoir.147 The loss of reserves available to the plaintiff and other reservoir owners outweighed the
marginal production increase the defendant achieved from using
artificial pumps.

143. Louisville Gas Co., 77 S.W. at 369 (internal citations omitted).
144. Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897).
145. In contract, efficient production practices by definition maximize the
value of reserves that are ultimately recovered.
146. Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Ind. Nat. Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912, 917 (Ind.
1900).
147. To determine whether production techniques are wasteful, courts frequently defer to local custom which, in turn, reliably reflects the physical characteristics of the reservoir. See, e.g., Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074, 1076 (Pa.
1900); Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co., 37 S.W.2d 367, 372–73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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The sine qua non of liability for physical waste is the fact
that the practice diminishes the total recoverable reserves otherwise available to the commoners without any offsetting benefit. It leaves the owners as a group marginally worse off relative
to the ordinary or customary manner of production employed in
the reservoir or reservoirs of similar type. Waste, then, provides
owners with a mechanism to hold other commoners accountable
when transactions in the common pool diminish its total net
value to all its owners.148
Though quick to remedy physical waste of a common reservoir, courts have hesitated to correct cases of alleged economic
waste or to compel owners in a common pool to maximize the
economic value of production. In two cases, Sneed v. Phillips Petroleum Co.149 and Corzelius v. Harrell,150 the plaintiffs sought
to require other owners to adopt production techniques that
would maximize the ultimate economic value of production removed from the pool—by prohibiting stripping of gas in Sneed
and requiring extraction of liquids in Corzelius. In both cases,
the court refused, even though those techniques could have increased both the value of the reservoir as a whole and the defendant’s portion. Waste doctrine does not mandate the optimal
use of resources from a common pool. Consistent with this formulation of waste as an outer boundary on the use of property,
in the absence of inefficient production methods or fruitless practices that diminish the reservoir itself, courts are hesitant to
supplement their own value-maximizing decisions about the
best use of production for that of the reservoir owners or administrative agencies.151
2. Statutory Waste Regulation of Oil and Gas
The judicial doctrine of waste is often of limited help to reservoir owners suffering because of another owner’s wasteful conduct. Oil and gas reservoirs typically have hundreds of individual owners, each with a relatively small fractional interest in the
total corpus. It generally makes little economic sense for
148. Remedies may include both an injunction to prevent ongoing waste and
damages to compensate for past losses.
149. Sneed v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 76 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1935).
150. Corzelius v. Harrell, 179 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
151. Id. (“The issue of waste due to method of extraction of liquids after the
gas was taken from the reservoir was one in which the Commission alone, as representative of the public, had an interest.”).
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individual owners to incur all the costs of litigating to remedy
waste when they will enjoy only a fraction of the benefits of a
remedy.152 Further, waste doctrine alone is insufficient to protect the public and private interests. As illustrated in economic
waste cases like Sneed and Corzelius, the judicial process is limited in its ability to maximize efficiency and overall value. Further, judicial remedies are generally retrospective and thus do
not prevent waste from happening in the first place—a major
limitation because the effects of waste are often permanent.153
Consequently, statutory and regulatory mechanisms improve
upon the common law doctrine by overcoming coordination problems and imposing clear ex ante rules.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given these limitations, the first
seventy-five years or so of oil and gas production in the United
States were marked by rampant waste.154 By the early twentieth century, states began to respond by adopting piecemeal
waste-prohibiting legislation.155 Beginning with the Supreme
Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,156 courts consistently upheld
these basic waste-prevention statutes against constitutional attacks under due process and the Takings Clause as a permissible
exercise of the police power to enforce reservoir owners’ private
rights to be free from waste.157 Courts found that these wasteprevention statutes simply gave effect to the common law prohibitions and, as such, were fully constitutional. Following the formation of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission
(IOGCC) in 1935 and its development of the Model Oil and Gas
152. Coordinating collective action among reservoir owners is difficult because
of their large numbers, accompanying transaction costs, and holdout problems.
153. See, e.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948) (involving the total destruction of a common reservoir of condensate from the defendant’s
wasteful negligence).
154. The rule of capture incentivized the drilling of too many wells, which were
produced at too great a rate, resulting in excessive capital investment, premature
dissipation of reservoir energy, and surpluses of production that overwhelmed
transportation facilities and market demands. See Schremmer, supra note 110;
Owen L. Anderson, The Evolution of Oil and Gas Conservation Law and the Rise of
Unconventional Hydrocarbon Production, 68 ARK. L. REV. 231, 232–36 (2015).
155. Examples included an Indiana statute prohibiting venting of natural gas
from a common pool that served the lighting and heating needs of nearby municipalities and a California statute imposing gas-to-oil ratio requirements to prevent
the waste of natural gas. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Bandini
Petroleum Co. v. Super. Ct., 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
156. Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. at 210.
157. E.g., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210
(1932); Bandini, 284 U.S. at 8; Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1911).
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Conservation Statute, all oil-and-gas-producing states adopted
comprehensive oil and gas conservation statutes prohibiting
waste.158 These statutes codify the judicial waste doctrine in
specific and detailed terms159 and enforce it through a number
of regulatory mechanisms, including well-construction and spacing requirements and compulsory pooling and unitization.160
Statutes passed after 1935 also authorized regulation of certain forms of economic waste. States imposed quotas limiting
production to no more than necessary to meet reasonable market
demand, often in the form of prorationing and allowables.161
Production in violation of such regulations is not protected by
the rule of capture and, therefore, entitles reservoir owners who
suffer drainage to seek damages for conversion.162 Statutes also
prohibited economic waste resulting from inefficient utilization
of gas.163 In upholding legislation prescribing economic waste in
Henderson Co. v. Thompson,164 the Supreme Court confirmed
that legislatures’ power to regulate production is not limited to
merely protecting against physical waste and adjusting private
correlative rights, but extends to limiting such private rights to
serve the public interest.165 Henderson affirmed that
158. Anderson, supra note 154.
159. E.g., MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 2(24) (INTERSTATE OIL &
GAS COMPACT COMM’N 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-3 (West 1978); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 30-5-101(a)(i) (West 1977).
160. See generally David E. Pierce, Coordinated Reservoir Development—An
Alternative to the Rule of Capture for Development of Oil and Gas, 4 J. ENERGY L.
& POL’Y 1, 62 (1983) (discussing the basic tools of conservation law).
161. Anderson, supra note 151, at 241–42; James Coleman, State Energy Cartels, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 2233, http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Website-3_COLEMAN.42.6.8.DONE-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72ZMX5H5] (discussing the cartelization of state industries to influence prices).
162. Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 571 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Loeffler v. King, 228 S.W.2d 201, 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
163. The usefulness of gas for municipal light and heating had become obvious,
yet many gas fields were located far from existing settlements, and pipeline transportation capacity was limited. Rather than transport gas to municipalities, many
producers sold their gas for gasoline stripping and carbon black manufacturing,
which consumed enormous amounts of gas while making little use of its heating
value. Concerned that the manufacturing process squandered natural gas capable
of one day supporting new and growing population centers, states adopted laws
declaring use of natural gas in carbon black manufacture to be waste. Natural gas
producers challenged these statues as uncompensated takings and violations of
their due process rights. See Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 59–
62 (1937); Walls v. Midland Carbon, 254 U.S. 300 (1930).
164. Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937).
165. Pierce, supra note 160, at 61–62; Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil &
Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185–86 (1950) (internal citations omitted) (“This Court has
upheld numerous kinds of state legislation designed to curb waste of natural
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legislatures, acting for public purposes rather than exclusively
to limit private harms, have greater ability to regulate forms of
economic waste than do courts.166
In recent decades, growing concerns over the environmental
and social costs of oil and gas development have led states to
reform their conservation laws to prioritize protection of public
health and the environment above prevention of waste.167 As
early as 1979, the Michigan Supreme Court construed that
state’s statutory waste prohibition to proscribe “any spoilation
or destruction of the land, including flora and fauna” and to prevent serious environmental damages from production.168 Most
recently, with the 2019 passage of Senate Bill 19-181, Colorado
amended its Oil and Gas Conservation Act to specify that waste
“[d]oes not include the nonproduction of oil [or gas] from a formation if necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare,
the environment, or wildlife resources as determined by the commission.”169 Thus, much like instream flow protections introduced in water law,170 SB 19-181 empowers the state’s conservation commission to require that some oil and gas be left in
place to protect the environment, wildlife, and public health. The
statute functionally expands the meaning of “utility” under the
waste principle to include environmental and human health considerations, as well as economic value, and expands the group of
relevant interests to include the public. As such, Colorado’s rule
serves as a social-benefit version of the waste principle, which
holds that where the marginal cost to society exceeds the benefits of production, loss of production is not waste. This change
marks a departure from established judicial and statutory definitions of waste to align more closely with the social concept,
which increasingly views the environmental and aesthetic degradation caused by oil and gas production and use as wasteful.171
resources and to protect the correlative rights of owners through ratable taking, or
to protect the economy of the state. These ends have been held to justify control
over production even though the uses to which property may profitably be put are
restricted.”).
166. Pierce, supra note 160, at 58–62; Henderson Co., 300 U.S. at 264.
167. See Tara K. Righetti, The Incidental Environmental Agency, 2020 UTAH
L. REV. 685 (2020).
168. Mich. Oil Co. v. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 276 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Mich. 1979).
169. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(b) (2019).
170. See infra notes 225–239 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Monika U. Ehrman, A Call for Energy Realism: When Immanuel Kant Met the Keep It in the Ground Movement, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 435
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B. Waste in Water Law
Like oil and gas reservoirs, water resources (e.g., lakes, rivers, and aquifers) are generally owned in common by multiple
parties each holding a nonexcludable claim to use the water.172
Unlike oil and gas, there is great variability among types of water resources, including surface resources and groundwater resources, both of which may be stock (depletable) or flow (renewable) types depending on whether depletion exceeds the rate of
recharge.173 To accommodate the variety and differing climate
conditions, eastern and western states developed distinct systems to allocate rights to use surface resources: prior appropriation in the West and riparianism in the East. In groundwater
aquifers, the common law adopted the rule of capture,174 although most jurisdictions today have adopted alternatives.175
The prohibition against waste is baked into each of these doctrines.176
Many western American states follow prior-appropriation
doctrine for both groundwater and surface waters.177 Originating as a custom among miners in 1800s California,178 the

(2019) (illustrating that concerns over wastewater disposal and climate change
were catalysts for the Keep It in the Ground Movement); Tara K. Righetti et al.,
The New Oil and Gas Governance, 130 YALE L.J.F. 51 (2020) (describing how state
legislatures have reshaped oil and gas law to better address environmental impacts).
172. ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:10
(2021).
173. Id.
174. Acton v. Blundell (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (UK); Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio St. 294 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324,
327 (Ohio 1984), overruled in part by McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d
640, 644 (Ohio 2005).
175. These include the correlative rights doctrine, a rule of reasonable use similar to riparian law (the “American Rule”), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
858A (AM. L. INST. 1979), or the prior-appropriation doctrine. Schremmer, supra
note 110; Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV.
265, 274–75 (2013).
176. See infra Section III.B.1.
177. Four prolific groundwater-producing states in the West do not follow prior
appropriation for groundwater. Arizona and Nebraska follow a regulated riparian
system, Texas applies the rule of capture, and California follows a form of correlative rights. See Dellapenna, supra note 175, at 276–80, 308 n.342.
178. Reed D. Benson, A Few Ironies of Western Water Law, 6 WYO. L. REV. 331,
333 (2006).
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doctrine was later adopted by western courts and legislatures.179 Under prior appropriation, groundwater and surface
waters are generally dedicated by statute or constitution to public ownership and state administration. Private parties may obtain rights to appropriate state waters, without proving ownership to appurtenant land, by diverting water for a “beneficial
use” in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations. Appropriative rights, therefore, never include the right to waste
water,180 to divert water purely for speculation, or to monopolize
it.181 Appropriation of water must be in a quantity that is nonwasteful.182 Thus, the appropriative right is coextensive with
the beneficial use in both quantity and duration.183
Riparian law is the primary water law system in the eastern
United States, where water is comparatively plentiful and water
uses tend to be less intense and consumptive than in the
West.184 Courts applying riparian law rarely utter the word
“waste,” but the waste principle nonetheless underpins the system. Under riparianism, owners of land abutting surface waters
have the right to “reasonable use” of the water, even if it diminishes the flow of a stream or level of a lake available to other
owners.185 Riparian rights are usufructuary, which “includes
the right to use and enjoy the property but not the right to waste
or convey the property.”186 Thus, much as waste cannot form the
basis for a water right under prior appropriation, no riparian
owner has the right to waste water from the common source of
supply.187
Though quite different from each other, each of these systems includes doctrinal and statutory waste prohibitions that
179. Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent
Depletion, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1263, 1271–72 (2014); see Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674
(Cal. 1886); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
180. See Shupe, supra note 8, at 495 (first citing Power v. Switzer, 55 P. 32
(Mont. 1898); and then citing Hough v. Porter, 95 P. 732, modified, 98 P. 1083 (Or.
1908), aff’d on rehearing, 102 P. 728 (Or. 1909)).
181. 1 SAMUEL WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 407 (3d ed.
1911); Neuman, supra note 116, at 962–63.
182. Frank J. Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law
of Surface Streams, 12 WYO. L.J. 1, 16 (1957); Neuman, supra note 116, at 926.
183. TARLOCK, supra note 172, § 5:68.
184. Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 290–92 (1990).
185. Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Mich. 1967); Heise v. Schulz, 204
P.2d 706, 713 (Kan. 1949).
186. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.04 (Amy K. Kelly ed., 3d ed. 2021).
187. Schulz, 204 P.2d at 712–13.
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limit the quantities of and purposes for which water may be
used. The waste principle is subsumed within rules of reasonable use in groundwater and riparian systems and beneficial use
in prior-appropriation systems. As in oil and gas law, these systems only legitimize uses of water that do not result in negativesum transactions in the common source. These doctrines prohibit inefficient and excessive uses that diminish the total net
utility of the resource or exclude others from access altogether.
Moreover, as in the oil and gas cases, courts in each of the water
law systems sparingly enforce these principles by injunction.188
As will be clear in the following discussion, the waste principle tends to require a higher degree of efficiency in the appropriation and use of water than it requires in oil and gas law. This
reflects an important difference between oil and gas and water.
While oil and gas resources are tremendously valuable and important to society, they lack the public importance of water,
which is needed to sustain life itself. For instance, water is typically dedicated to ownership by the public, whereas oil and gas
are not. The waste principle responds to water’s unique public
importance by imposing somewhat more exacting standards
than are seen in oil and gas law.
The waste principle inherently limits rights in water
through its requirements that water must be used beneficially
or reasonably, efficiently, and in a manner that does not monopolize the resource or diminish the fair rights of access and use by
others. As the next two Subsections demonstrate, these tenets
against waste have been customized within various common law
water systems and incorporated in contemporary statutes without departing significantly from the waste principle.
1. Common Law of Water Waste
Water appropriation systems limit withdrawals from the
common pool based on use. The quantity of water available to a
specific user is determined neither as a set proportion to the pool
nor based on the motive of the user,189 but rather by the extent
188. E.g., Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 910 (Minn. 1903) (applying the rule of capture); Campbell v. Grimes, 64 P. 62, 62 (Kan. 1901) (applying
riparianism); Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 82 P. 718, 718 (Wash.
1905) (applying prior-appropriation doctrine).
189. Consider Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, where the plaintiff alleged the
defendant dug a ditch on his property for the sole purpose of diverting water from
under plaintiff’s property “to the annihilation of plaintiff’s business.” Employing
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to which the user can efficiently put water to beneficial use. This
principle is reflected in the useful-purpose requirement within
the rule of capture for groundwater,190 the beneficial-use requirement in the doctrine of prior appropriation,191 and the reasonable-use rule of riparianism. At their core, the primary purpose of these doctrines is to avoid waste of water192 by assuring
that both the quantity and purpose of the appropriation are nonwasteful.193
Traditionally, courts considered a use to be beneficial or reasonable if it generated a net gain in economic value compared
with nonuse of the water. Perhaps the broadest of the surfaceappropriation doctrines, riparianism allows “almost any application of water that fulfills a need or desire of man [to] be considered a proper use.”194 Similarly, most rule-of-capture courts
prohibited waste by limiting the right to drain water from under
neighboring parcels to situations where the water was put to a
“useful purpose.”195 Standard beneficial uses in appropriation
states included domestic uses, municipal uses, irrigation, stock
watering, mining, and water power,196 representing a preference for uses that supported economic growth and development.
Although flexible enough to expand in response to “changes in
society’s recognition of the value of new uses of our resources,”
reasoning identical to oil and gas cases like Louisville Gas, the court held that the
privilege afforded under the rule of capture to damage other common owners by
drainage is contingent on the supply being used to generate some benefit. See
Stillwater Water Co., 93 N.W. at 908; Nadav Shoked, Two Hundred Years of Spite,
110 N.W. L. REV. 357, 377–82 (2004) (demonstrating that courts do not consider the
actor’s intent but only the social value of the water’s uses).
190. See Cantwell v. Zinser, 208 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); SlossSheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 165 So. 764 (Ala. 1936); Patrick v. Smith, 134
P. 1076, 1079 (Wash. 1913). Today, the only American jurisdiction still following
the rule of capture is Texas.
191. The “beneficial use” requirement has been codified in the prior-appropriation statutes and constitutions of most western states. See Neuman, supra note
116.
192. TARLOCK, supra note 172, § 5:70 (first citing A-B Cattle Co. v. United
States, 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978), and then citing Union Mill & Mining Co. v.
Dangberg, 81 F. 73 (Cir. Ct. Nev. 1897)).
193. Neuman, supra note 116, at 926 (noting that all that is required is that
the use be “socially acceptable”).
194. Trelease, supra note 182, at 6. In this context, the reasonable-use doctrine
may be broader than beneficial use under prior-appropriation law. For instance,
courts have traditionally considered recreation to be reasonable and have limited
later appropriations that would lower water levels and impair established recreational uses. In re Martha Lake, 277 P. 382, 382 (Wash. 1929).
195. See Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 20 So. 780, 784 (Fla. 1896).
196. TARLOCK, supra note 172, § 5:68.
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the doctrines fundamentally reflect an economic view of water
resources that favors use.197 Consequently, under both systems,
leaving water resources unused could constitute waste unless
the ultimate purpose was somehow commercial.198
Yet the waste principle within these doctrines requires that
the waste not only produce gains, but also that it does not produce negative-sum losses. This requires that appropriations for
new purposes are, at least theoretically, beneficial considering
contemporary technology and water scarcity.199 As the amount
of unappropriated water has dwindled in western states, courts
in appropriation-doctrine states have interpreted beneficial use
to require greater efficiency in use of water.200 Echoing this
same principle, courts in the riparian and common law groundwater systems have restricted use or transfers of water outside
of the basin where it was drawn.201 Though subsequent developments have blurred the distinction between inter- and intrabasin uses, these place-of-use limitations incorporated the
197. Dekay v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 524 N.W.2d 855, 858 (S.D. 1994)
(quoting Rick A. Thompson, Statutory Recognition of Instream Flow Preservation:
A Proposed Solution for Wyoming, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 139, 143 (1982)).
198. In re Metro. Util. Dist. of Omaha, 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 (Neb. 1966); Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123, 128–29 (8th Cir. 1913);
Campbell v. Grimes, 64 P. 62, 62 (Kan. 1901) (enjoining an upper riparian proprietor from permitting water to run to waste over a sand bar onto non-productive land).
Today, nonuse—leaving water in its channel—is permitted as nonwasteful by statute in many jurisdictions.
199. Shupe, supra note 8, at 498 (citing Tudor v. Jaca, 164 P.2d 680 (Or. 1945)).
200. Broughton v. Stricklin, 28 P.2d 219, 279 (Or. 1933); Trelease, supra note
182, at 16.
201. For instance, many courts permitted beneficial uses of groundwater “in
connection with the land,” while finding that sales of groundwater outside the basin
violate the rights of others in the common pool. Compare Wiggins v. Brazil Coal &
Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958, 961–64 (Ind. 1983), and Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 46
N.Y.S. 141 (App. Div. 1897), and Right to Conduct and Use Artesian Water out of
Artesian Basin, 31 A.L.R. 906 (1924), with City of Corpus Christi v. City of
Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801–02 (Tex. 1955) (citing 56 AM. JUR., § 118, at 601
(1995)) (“There certainly was no limitation that prohibited the use of the water off
of the premises where it was captured. Neither was there any restriction of its use
to a particular area. Under the so-called ‘common-law’ or ‘English’ rule, which prevails in some jurisdictions, the right to extract artesian water for use outside the
basin or district in which it is found would seem to be unrestricted.”). Similarly,
traditional riparianism required that water be used to benefit only riparian lands
and inter-basin transfers and uses of water to benefit non-riparian lands were held
to be unreasonable use. See Transfer of Riparian Right to Use Water to Nonriparian
Land, 14 A.L.R. 330 (originally published in 1921); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 7.03 (Amy K. Kelly ed., 3d ed. 2021). Some courts permit appropriations to benefit
non-riparian land, but only if they do not interfere with the use that any riparian
owner was making of the water. E.g., Brown v. Chase, 217 P. 23, 26–27 (Wash.
1923).
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principle that economic and beneficial uses of collectively owned
resources should inure to the same community of owners from
which they are withdrawn.202
Both riparian and prior-appropriation systems impose minimum-efficiency standards on the quantity of water appropriated for beneficial or reasonable use. Use of water may be enjoined, not because the use is inherently valueless but because
it involves an exceedingly inefficient quantity of water relative
to the value of the use or the lost value of water available to other
users.203 Applying this reasoning in a small number of prior-appropriation cases, courts have prohibited appropriations for uses
they found inefficient: forming ice over fields to preserve soil
moisture,204 soaking a field to make it easier to plow,205 flooding
fields to exterminate rodents,206 and transporting sand and
gravel for mining.207 Riparian courts similarly require that the
riparian’s use of water be minimally efficient to achieve its beneficial purpose.208 For example, in Peabody v. City of Vallejo, the
court held that a riparian was not entitled to demand the full
flow of the stream merely because some slight benefits resulted
when he used the overflow to deposit silt on his lands, wash salt
from his marshes, or replenish groundwater.209 As Peabody
noted, what constitutes waste of water depends on “the circumstances of each case,” and necessarily changes as circumstances

202. In this way, these limitations mirror the holding of Jackson v. Brownson,
which permitted the cutting of timber for brick-bote used on the premises but prohibited off-lease sales. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
203. See TARLOCK, supra note 172, § 5:71. For example, in one case, the Oregon
Supreme Court reduced the amount of water a power company could use to dispose
of ice and debris at its dam during irrigation season because permitting the use
would “be equal to depriving about 1,600 acres of land of water for irrigation.” In re
Water Rights of Deschutes River and Tributaries, 286 P. 563, 577–78 (Or. 1930).
204. Blain Cnty. Inv. Co. v. Mays, 291 P. 1055, 1057 (Idaho 1930).
205. Heunings v. Water Res. Dept., 622 P.2d 333, 335 (Or. 1981).
206. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d
972, 1007 (Cal. 1935). Contra Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607, 617
(Cal. 1926) (finding that plaintiff’s use of the overflow of a river for irrigation was
economically wasteful but nonetheless holding that power company was not entitled to dam up the river). Herminghaus was so repellent to the California legislature that it amended the constitution two years later. See Gin S. Chow v. City of
Santa Barbara, 22 P.2d 5, 15 (Cal. 1933).
207. Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
208. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.03 (Amy K. Kelly ed., 3d ed. 2021) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (5th ed. 1998));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A cmt. i (Am. L. Inst. 1979).
209. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 369 (1935).
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change.210 As demands on a water resource increase or the resource becomes less plentiful, the minimum-efficiency requirement of waste law ratchets up.211
Courts also prohibit means of diversion that are so egregiously inefficient as to be wasteful. Take Shodde v. Twin Falls
Land & Water Co.,212 where the Supreme Court declined to limit
other appropriators from using the flow of the Snake River to
protect the plaintiff’s particular means of diversion, namely antiquated water wheels that required nearly the entire flow of the
river to operate. The Court would not recognize a vested right to
a means of diversion that was so inefficient as “to deprive a
whole neighborhood or community of its use and vest an absolute
monopoly in a single individual.”213 Waste does not, however,
require that diversions be maximally efficient. Particularly
when water is abundant, courts permit some loss of water related to the manner of diversion. By referencing local custom as
the baseline for minimum-acceptable efficiency, courts permit
appropriators under beneficial-use doctrine to divert enough water to accommodate both the underlying beneficial purpose and
any customary losses of water related to the means of diversion.214 As waters became fully appropriated, however, courts
began to require greater efficiency in diversions and conveyances than was customary to allow others to share in the limited
supply.215
Judicial efficiency requirements in water systems give effect
to the waste principle’s bar against negative-sum transitions
and monopolies. Just as courts limit wasteful means of
210. Id. at 367; see also Tulare Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d at 1007 (“What is a
beneficial use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become a waste of
water at a later time.”).
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (Am. L. Inst. 1979).
212. Shodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912). The authoritative discussion of Shodde and the evolving nature of the reasonable beneficialuse requirement is Tarlock, supra note 8.
213. Shodde, 224 U.S. at 121; see also Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade
Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913) (denying appropriative right to the entire flow
of a waterfall to support resort).
214. Shupe, supra note 8, at 491.
215. Such was the case in Doherty v. Pratt, which held that the senior appropriator could no longer divert his portion of the water into a natural creek bed where
two-thirds of it was lost to seepage and evaporation. Doherty v. Pratt, 124 P. 574,
576–77 (Nev. 1912); accord Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 446,
450 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding there is no privilege to maintain an inefficient conveyance when another appropriator “may be willing to invest in a more efficient conveyance system in order to capture and use the water now lost en route”).
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production in oil and gas, courts applying water law doctrines
prevent marginal losses to the common pool resource by limiting
efficiency losses in the manner of diversion. Compare Shodde
with Manufacturers’ Gas. In both cases, an appropriator was denied the right to use a means of diversion that was so inefficient
that it practically monopolized the resource by denying other appropriators a fair opportunity to use it. Although courts in water
law cases have been more willing to actively police production
methods for minimum efficiency, in both instances, courts limit
appropriations only in the most extreme cases216¾that is, where
the collective losses of resource access suffered by the other common owners substantially exceed any modest gains enjoyed by
the appropriator.
Prior appropriation and riparianism also expressly limit resource monopolies through limits on the right to store water or
to block access to water resources. Prior appropriation excludes
appropriations for the sole purpose of storing water for speculation or monopoly. In Weaver v. Eureka Lake Co.,217 the court invalidated the defendant’s claim of a prior-appropriation right to
dam water to ensure a sufficient supply of water for its diversion
during summer months.218 The court explained that the defendant’s claim was invalid because “[t]he water was not claimed for
any useful or beneficial purpose,” but instead “for no other object
. . . than that of speculation.”219 Likewise, riparianism’s reasonable use rule does not include storing water without putting it
to a productive purpose.220 In this way, the beneficial and reasonable use requirements prevent monopolizing uses which diminish the net total utility of the resource and violate the waste
principle.
Courts in both systems also further the anti-monopoly policy by prohibiting one rights holder from blocking others’ access
to common supply. In Kurrle v. Walker, a riparian case, a littoral
owner was liable to other owners for constructing a water fence
213. See Shupe, supra note 8 (“Inefficient customary practices of appropriators
have been limited in only a few cases, where the percentage of water lost was extreme and local waters were in short supply.”).
217. Weaver v. Eureka Lake Co., 15 Cal. 271 (1860).
218. Id. at 273–74.
219. Id. at 275.
220. Sturtevant v. Ford, 182 N.E. 560, 565 (Mass. 1932). In holding that damming up a common stream to create a storage reservoir was unreasonable, the court
in Sturtevant explained that riparian law grants “no right of property in such water
in the sense that it can be the subject of exclusive appropriation and dominion.” Id.
at 561.
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that effectively blocked the plaintiffs’ co-equal rights to access
the lake for swimming, boating, and fishing.221 Similarly, in
Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., a prior-appropriation case, a littoral owner was liable for constructing a dam in
a lake for irrigation because it completely blocked other owners’
lake access.222 The collective losses of access generally outweighed the gains internalized by the monopolist, leaving the
owners as a group worse off than if the monopolist had not constructed the improvement.
In sum, the provisions of water law doctrines preclude waste
in multiple ways. Reasonable and beneficial-use provisions prohibit waste by requiring that any take from the common source
be put to a use that produces at least some benefit to offset the
concurrent losses to the other common pool owners. These provisions also require a minimum level of efficiency in how the water is used and diverted to ensure that whatever benefit the user
enjoys does not come at the expense of a disproportionate loss of
access to the supply by other owners. And for the same reason,
each water law system forbids one owner from monopolizing the
resource or blocking access to a substantial portion of it. Yet the
anemic level of judicial enforcement of these provisions—while
probably greater than that seen in the oil and gas context—undermines the power of these doctrines to give effect to the waste
principle. In the common law of water rights, the waste principle
may seem to have more bark than bite.
2. Statutory Regulation of Water Waste
Growing demand for water, expanding urbanization, and recurring droughts have increased the public’s interest in efficient
administration and prevention of water waste. Several state legislatures have responded by codifying and modifying common
law rules against waste for surface and groundwater appropriations.223 These modifications have taken significantly different
221. Kurrle v. Walker, 224 N.W.2d 99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
222. Madson v. Spokane Valley Land & Water Co., 82 P. 718 (Wash. 1905).
Anti-monopoly concerns are particularly strong in western water law. In western
states, constitutional provisions limit resource monopolies and protect access to waterways for purposes of appropriation, at times granting private parties the right
to condemn ditches and canals.
223. Statutory modification of the common law of groundwater has been limited. Most states adopted either prior-appropriation or a reasonable-use-based doctrine to govern groundwater. Those groundwater waste statutes largely
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forms in prior-appropriation and riparian states and, therefore,
require separate discussion.
a. Prior Appropriation’s Beneficial Use
Traditional principles of beneficial use have undergone significant statutory modification in certain jurisdictions. In response to changing societal values, legislatures have expanded
the list of beneficial uses. Today, water statutes permit appropriation for an array of recreational and environmental purposes
that lack a direct and measurable economic value and thus
would not have qualified under traditional beneficial-use categories.224 Today, states condone as beneficial the act of leaving
water in its channel for fish and wildlife maintenance and instream flow protection.225 Changing values have also led some
legislatures to reclassify uses from beneficial to wasteful in order
to conserve water, such as when Nevada authorized Las Vegas
to prohibit use of water for artificial lakes and streams.226
The harmful impacts of water scarcity have also led some of
the driest states to incur the costs of “crisis-inspired” legislation,227 by enforcing stricter statutory controls to improve efficiency of water diversions and use. For example, California statutorily requires that agricultural water supplies implement
“efficient water management practices.”228 Many other states
have adopted legislation providing for critical groundwater management areas. These statutes overlay the doctrines of beneficial
use and straightforwardly limit the amount of water allowed to
all groundwater users.229
Legislative changes also inject the beneficial-use doctrine
with noneconomic considerations and expand its scope to include
public interests not previously considered. Under traditional
incorporated the limitations of the common law. E.g., City of Corpus Christi v. City
of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1955). When states passed waste statutes
that were inconsistent with common law waste doctrine, courts struck them down
as unconstitutional takings of private property without compensation. E.g., Huber
v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354, 370 (Wis. 1903). Texas courts still follow the common law
rule of capture for groundwater.
224. Shupe, supra note 8, at 487–89.
225. TARLOCK, supra note 172, § 5:68.
226. Id.
227. Neuman, supra note 116, at 956.
228. CAL. WATER CODE § 10903 (West 1990); accord CAL. WATER CODE § 10902
(West 1990).
229. Neuman, supra note 116, at 948–53.
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beneficial-use doctrine, the public interest was considered
served if a water use generated some positive economic value for
the appropriator. With the modern additions to the list of beneficial uses, uses of water that render no economic gain to appropriators may qualify as beneficial, whereas they would have
been wasteful under prior law. Due to the costs of public administration and the political difficulty legislatures face when refining common law doctrines,230 states undertake significant modifications of beneficial-use doctrine only after water stocks
become scarce and fully or over-appropriated. Thus, statutory
waste controls increase concomitantly with the public’s interest
and resource scarcity.
b. Regulated Riparianism
Just as western states responded to water shortages with
increased regulation, several eastern states have also displaced
much of riparian doctrine by statute.231 Eastern states increasingly regulate consumptive uses of waters at levels similar to
western water law but based on principles of reasonable use rather than prior appropriation.232 In general, riparian water
codes require public permits before using water from a common
source, and only “reasonable” or “beneficial” uses of water are
entitled to permits. These terms are typically defined as a use of
water that does not involve waste,233 which in turn is often defined as something like “causing, suffering, or permitting the
consumption or use of the waters of the State for a purpose or in
a manner that is not reasonable.”234 Riparian codes thus largely
codify the antiwaste provisions of the common law doctrine but
impose ex ante administrative permitting requirements instead
of ex post judicial determinations of waste and reasonable
use.235

230. See id. at 948–55.
231. Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code: Blueprint for
21st Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 113
(2000).
232. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01 (Amy K. Kelly ed., 3d ed. 2021).
233. See id. § 9.03.
234. REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE § 2R-2-27 (AM. SOC’Y OF CIV.
ENG’RS 2004).
235. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 232, § 9.03 (citing IOWA CODE
§ 455B.265(1), (2), (7) (West 2019)); see Joseph W. Dellapenna, supra note 175, at
85–90.
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As in the West, eastern water codes often provide for
maintenance of instream flows for environmental and aesthetic
purposes.236 Since the judicial doctrine does not necessarily protect a minimum level of flow for aesthetic and environmental
purposes,237 several states have enacted legislation protecting
minimum flows through various means, “including withdrawal
programs, reservation provisions, and minimum or preservation
flow programs.”238 These statutory protections limit the exercise
of common law riparian rights for the benefit of public values.
Riparian codes that go beyond merely delineating and administering private rights and limit those rights in furtherance of a
public interest are subject to the requirements of due process
and the Takings Clause. As the Court in United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co. explained, when requiring that downstream riparians be compensated for their loss of water to further the
state’s highly inefficient upstream water reclamation project,
“the public welfare, which requires [riparians] to sacrifice their
benefits to broader ones from a higher utilization, does not necessarily require that their loss be uncompensated any more than
in other takings where private rights are surrendered in the
public interest.”239
IV. WASTE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC-TRUST
DOCTRINE
Though courts do not often evoke “waste” itself, the waste
principle also underpins the law governing management of public property. The common law public-trust doctrine requires governments to hold, administer, and manage public property as a
kind of trustee for the public. Much like waste doctrine does in
the private contexts described above, the public-trust doctrine
prohibits the state from using, disposing of, or allowing private
use of trust property in a manner that reduces its net total utility
to the beneficiaries—namely the public at large. The doctrine
therefore forbids a governmental trustee from allowing private
parties to monopolize or make negative-sum uses of public
236. Lee P. Breckenridge, Maintaining Instream Flow and Protecting Aquatic
Habitat: Promise and Perils on the Path to Regulated Riparianism, 106 W. VA. L.
REV. 595, 596 (2004).
237. Id. at 595–97.
238. Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of
Public Property, 9 VA. ENV’T L.J. 323, 344–51 (1990).
239. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752 (1950).
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property.240 The function and evolution of the public-trust doctrine in these contexts mirror the private law’s waste doctrine.
A. Prohibiting Waste of Inherently Public Property
The public-trust doctrine developed with respect to property
that was public by virtue of its inherent physical characteristics—what Carol Rose calls “inherently public property.”241 The
physical characteristics of these resources render them an openaccess commons, which is naturally nonexcludable and rivalrous
among all members of the public.242 Resources subject to the
public-trust doctrine classically included submerged lands,
shorelines, and wildlife243 and were limited to uses like fishing
and navigation.244 Like waste in private law, however, the public-trust doctrine is adaptive to changing social values around
use and utility.245 Courts since the 1970s, for example, have recognized public rights in recreational uses246 and in the perseveration of public resources for habitat, open space, and scientific
study.247 Inherently public property nonetheless requires an
240. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public
Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine, 44 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 1 (2017) (characterizing privatization of certain natural resources as antithetical to the public-trust
doctrine).
241. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986).
242. Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411,
414 (1987) (describing such property as being held in common because common
ownership “minimizes the bargaining problems associated with moving the asset to
its highest-valued use”).
243. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588
(Ct. App. 2008).
244. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71, 78 (1821).
245. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
246. Id.; Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47,
53 (N.J. 1972).
247. S.F. Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Comm’n, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 904–
05 (Ct. App. 2015). Some judges have suggested expanding the doctrine in other
ways, such as by requiring states to manage trust resources for both present and
future generations’ benefit. E.g., Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State,
103 P.3d 203, 208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (Quinn-Brintnall, J., concurring). Yet
courts have been slower to extend the doctrine to protect new classes of natural
resources, like the atmosphere. Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088 (Alaska
2014) (declining to declare the atmosphere a public trust resource); accord Butler
ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at *6 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013); Filippone ex rel. Filippone v. Iowa Dept. Nat. Res., No. 12—
444, 2013 WL 988627, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013); Aronow v. State, No.
A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012); Chernaik v.
Brown, 436 P.3d 26, 33–34 (Or. Ct. App 2019).
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organized system of management by a centralized public authority, acting as a fiduciary or “trustee” on behalf of the public, to
avoid common pool problems like waste.248 Accordingly, the public-trust doctrine places limits on the state in managing inherently public property that are analogous to the limits waste doctrines impose on individual use of privately owned common pool
property.
The public-trust doctrine generally prohibits the complete
alienation of inherently public property to private transferees
for nonpublic purposes.249 Such property necessarily loses its
economic and noneconomic value to the public when privatized.250 The doctrine nevertheless permits private use of, and
construction upon, inherently public property so long as the activity does not monopolize the property, block access to it, or otherwise substantially reduce its availability to the rest of the public.251 This principle is demonstrated in the country’s earliest
public trust cases.252 Take, for example, the famous Supreme
Court case Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, where the Court
held the state could not permit a private party to monopolize
control over the harbor of Lake Michigan.253 The Court explained that a state may grant private rights in submerged lands
to erect wharves, docks, piers, and other structures, but only if
they “aid in commerce” and “do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and water remaining.”254 The Washington Supreme Court reiterated this point a century later, explaining that the public-trust doctrine “prohibits the State from
disposing of its interest in the waters of the state in such a way
that the public’s right of access is substantially impaired, unless
the action promotes the overall interests of the public.”255 The
public-trust doctrine requires that there must be some gain that

248. Rose, supra note 241; Epstein, supra note 242, 418–19.
249. See Epstein, supra note 242, at 417–18 (explaining that the public-trust
doctrine prohibits private use of public property without just compensation).
250. Id. at 419–20.
251. Joseph L. Sax, Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970).
252. E.g., Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 408, 411, 418
(1842) (prohibiting a landowner from monopolizing control of oysters buried below
the Raritan River’s ordinary high-water mark); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71,
45–46, 65–66 (1821) (same).
253. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892).
254. Id.
255. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993).
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justifies any public losses.256 Permitting a private monopoly
over inherently public property violates the public-trust doctrine
in the same way that monopolization of common pool property
violates the waste principle—by permitting private uses that
generate unjustified losses to the resource’s value to all its owners. It follows that a government “trustee” also must not permit
a private party to damage or destroy the resource as to diminish
its net total utility to the public at large. In this way, the publictrust doctrine forbids the same kind of self-serving behavior in
the public realm as the doctrine of waste forbids in private common pool property and thereby preserves the corpus of commonly held resources from the most inefficient, destructive, and
purposeless extractions.
B. Public-Trust Doctrine Cases as Waste Cases
As in the private context, uses of public-trust property violate the waste principle (and the public-trust doctrine) when
they produce gains to a private party that pale compared with
the resulting losses to the public.257 In fact, courts applying the
public-trust doctrine expressly inquire whether the private use
will result in a net reduction in the total utility of the resource
to the public.258 Consider Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., where the legislature conveyed title to a navigable lake to a private party for the purpose of dredging the lake
and reselling the uncovered land.259 Citing Illinois Central Railroad, Priewe held that the conveyance violated the public-trust
doctrine because it destroyed the rights of other owners of the
256. See Blumm & Moses, supra note 240, at 16 (noting the anti-monopoly aspect of the case).
257. The convergence of private waste and the public trust was on display in
a recent case, Mineral County v. Lyon County, where the Nevada Supreme Court
recognized that the public-trust doctrine applies to surface and groundwater owned
by the state under prior-appropriation doctrine. Min. Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty., 473 P.3d
418, 426 (Nev. 2020) (holding that the provisions of prior-appropriation law requiring beneficial use and curtailing water rights for waste satisfied the state’s public
trust responsibilities).
258. See, e.g., State v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Wis. 1957)
(“[I]mpairment must be weighed against the other public interests to be served and
unless the impairment so viewed is substantial, the impairment is not a violation
of the trust.”); Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 101 P.3d 891, 895 (Wash. 2004) (explaining the doctrine “obligates the state
to balance the protection of the public’s right to use resources on public land with
the protection of the resources that enable these activities”).
259. Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896).
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lake and the public “for the sole benefit of private parties.”260
Like an owner’s fencing off part of a lake or stream from other
owners, the conveyance condemned the lake to all but one party,
allowing him to monopolize its benefits. Additionally, the transferee’s monopoly made access to the lake by other owners and
members of the public impossible, or at least prohibitively costly.
Thus, for the same reason that these actions, if undertaken by a
private riparian owner, would violate the waste principle, the
public conveyance of the lake violated the public-trust doctrine.
In contrast, private uses of trust property that do not cause
disproportionate public losses do not violate the public trust.
Thirty years after Priewe, the same court again considered a legislative conveyance of submerged lands, this time upholding the
conveyance. In City of Milwaukee v. State, the legislature
granted the right to construct a slip dock extending 1,500 feet
into the lake for the benefit of a private steel company as partial
compensation for an earlier condemnation of its pier.261 The
court found that the proposed private dock would not significantly interfere with navigability of the vast Lake Michigan, and
distinguished Priewe on those grounds. Despite creating a private benefit, the conveyance did not violate public trust because
it produced private gains without diminishing the utility of the
shoreline to the public at large.262
Changing environmental and water-scarcity concerns have
led courts to broaden the scope of actions that violate the publictrust doctrine. At its inception, the doctrine simply prohibited
the state from alienating trust property.263 However, in the 1983
case National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court required the state to affirmatively protect trust
property by reviewing proposed state action for its effect on trust

260. Id. at 922.
261. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 820 (Wis. 1927).
262. Id. at 829–30. In a similar case, City of Madison v. State, the court again
weighed private gains against public losses to determine whether the state violated
the public trust by filling in part of a navigable lake to build a civic center. The
court upheld the state’s action on the grounds that the proposed building would be
open to the public and devoted to public purposes, and that “the disappointment of
those members of the public who may desire to boat, fish or swim in the area to be
filled is negligible when compared with the greater convenience to be afforded those
members of the public who will use the building.” City of Madison v. State, 83
N.W.2d 674, 678 (Wis. 1957).
263. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71, 78 (1821); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892).
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resources.264 As is typical in waste cases in the private context,
the National Audubon Society court did not tell the state how to
manage its trust assets but rather merely furnished an outline
of a governance process through which the competing interests
in the property could be balanced.265 The public-trust doctrine’s
incremental common law expansion mirrors the evolution of
waste. Just as concepts of waste grew to require minimum flows
in streams under prior appropriation and riparianism, the public-trust doctrine grew to require the very same in National
Audubon Society. Similarly, the problem of water scarcity
caused the court to increase the doctrine’s minimum requirements, much as the same problem caused courts to increase the
minimum-efficiency requirements imposed by beneficial and
reasonable use doctrines in water law. Here too, however, judicial enforcement of the doctrine has been limited primarily to
extreme cases, leaving marginal violations of the waste principle
unremedied.
Also, as in the private context, states often codify the vague
provisions of the common law doctrine in an effort to improve
their enforcement.266 In states where preserving natural resources is considered especially important, public-trust constitutional provisions tend to reach beyond the extent of the common
law doctrine to impose greater limits on private use of publictrust property.267 While these constitutional amendments
264. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
265. Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and
Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45
ENV’T L. 561, 640 (2015). While pathbreaking in its extension of the public-trust
doctrine to waters within tributaries, the jurisdictional trend outside of California
generally has not followed National Audubon Society.
266. See Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1169–70 (1997) (discussing state constitutional amendments).
267. Some of these merely incorporate the common law doctrine by limiting
the ability of the state to give away public resources. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, §
3; see also TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a); HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Others, however,
expand the scope of the common law doctrine. Some require the state to manage
trust resources for the benefit of future as well as present generations. HAW. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; see also MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Still others
affirmatively require that the state provide a clean and healthful environment. PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Some provisions extend the public
trust to include air, such as HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1, taking a step that courts have
hesitated to take on their own. See Chernaik v. Kitzhaber, 328 P.3d 799 (Or. Ct.
App. 2014) (involving a claim that the state holds the atmosphere in public trust);
see also Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological

658

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

extend the doctrine beyond its common law boundaries, they do
not absolutely prohibit private use and development of trust resources;268 rather, they permit uses that do not destroy the corpus of the trust.269 Constitutional public-trust provisions thus
conserve the utility of trust resource for present and future use
consistently with the waste principle—by preventing alienation
or total degradation of the trust asset so as to substantially impair the public welfare interests the resource serves.270
V. THE MODERN RELEVANCE OF WASTE: LESSONS FOR
PROPERTY THEORY AND FOR REENGAGING COMMON LAW
COURTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT
The waste principle and the common law doctrines it underpins are not dead law. The problems that plague modern property, environmental, and natural resources law are those that
the waste principle is adept at handling: governance of commonly held resources. In fact, leading contemporary theories
about property law envision, as normative goals, property arrangements that resemble the waste principle. Despite its potential to help resolve ongoing environmental and natural resources management problems, the common law of waste has
been largely mothballed in favor of centralized, top-down statutory and regulatory controls. The modern turn away from reliance on the waste principle—and the common law more generally—has contributed to the law’s seeming inability to address
society’s pressing resource-scale problems.
Drawing from contemporary theories of property, natural
resources, and environmental law, Section V.A demonstrates
how the waste principle forms an inextricable component of an
efficient and liberal system of common property governance.
Next, Section V.B observes how the decline in common law

Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENV’T L. 43 (2009) (proposing use
of the public-trust doctrine to govern management of the atmosphere and other resources).
268. Jack R. Tuholske, U.S. State Constitutions and Environmental Protection: Diamonds in the Rough, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 247 (2015).
269. Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 939 (Pa. 2017).
270. Id.; State ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Env’t Scis. v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473
(Mont. 1987); State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977); Alexandra B.
Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 714–15 (2006).
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enforcement of the waste principle, and the common law more
generally,271 and overreliance on statutory and regulatory controls has contributed to the law’s seeming inability to address
society’s pressing resource-scale problems. While administrative
regulation of common property importantly establishes baseline
standards and rules to prevent certain harms, it depends on the
waste principle to provide legitimacy, establish norms, and assure accountability by providing relief for redressable harms.
Examining waste as a foundational principle to all property, this
Article reimagines waste doctrine as what it could be rather
than focusing on its limitations and diminished relevance in specific contexts. Toward that end, Section V.C examines three ongoing environmental and natural resources management problems where the waste principle could provide a useful tool for
resolution: extending the public trust to the atmosphere, controlling venting and flaring of natural gas, and addressing harms
caused by unregulated pollutants.
A. Waste and Contemporary Property Theory
1. Waste and Efficiency in Property Law
In operation, the waste principle tends to defer to the owners of a common resource to govern the resource to the extent it
is practically workable. The practicability of leaving governance
to owners depends on the scale of the resource and the number
of potential interests and owners within the relevant property
community. As such, applications of the waste principle run
along a spectrum from private governance to complete public administration. Deference to self-governance is most practicable
where a resource is owned by a single person in fee simple or
where property is intentionally divided through private transaction, such as by the creation of legal life estates, thus giving parties opportunities to efficiently customize the rights and liabilities to their particular needs. Where parties have few
opportunities to customize land interests, such as in the case of
“collective but non-public property” arrangements, waste rules
often take the form of nonwaivable statutory or regulatory

271. Joshua Ulan Galperin & Douglas A. Kysar, Uncommon Law: Judging in
the Anthropocene, in CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (Douglas
A. Kysar & Jolene Lin eds., 2020).
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duties.272 These rules create baseline standards, encourage efficient use, and coordinate cooperation among owners through formal notice and hearing processes.273 Finally, for inherently public property like navigable waters and coastal resources, the law
imposes a nondelegable duty on the government to restrain private uses to avoid waste.274
The waste principle thus tracks the Demsetz property thesis
that land regimes develop to be cost minimizing.275 Forms of
land ownership that typically involve few owners who share
preexisting social relationships, such as split and successive estates in land, require little legal regulation because transaction
and information costs are low and the property is conducive to
informal private management.276 For these forms of ownership,
waste doctrine provides a backstop against monopolization and
destruction of the property if the owners’ interests diverge but
encourages owners to develop their own set of rules for the property. However, as the number and location of potential owners
becomes more diffuse, transaction and information costs often
prevent owners from engaging in voluntary, self-initiated governance.
Thus, common law restrictions crystalize into statutes and
administrative rules to overcome the transaction costs and coordination problems that prevent large numbers of strangers from
effectively cooperating and enforcing their rights against waste.
Though costly to administer, public regulation may lower transaction costs by identifying and notifying affected landowners,
promulgating clear rules, monitoring and enforcing compliance,
and instituting formal consultation and hearing procedures
when owners wish to deviate from the baseline rules. By connecting owners and creating clear rules for use, administrative
regulation of common pool resources enables owners to communicate and aggregate interests through pooling, joint operations, and market transactions.
Finally, where transaction costs would be completely unwieldy due to the public nature of the property, legislative and
272. Carol Rose, Left Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of
Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479 (2000).
273. McCord v. Oakland Quicksilver Mining Co., 27 P. 863 (Cal. 1883).
274. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1320–21
(1993).
275. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 347 (1967).
276. Ellickson, supra note 274.
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executive branches of government execute their public trust responsibilities through myriad statutes and regulations governing private uses of public resources, within the constraints of the
waste principle. Though large-scale public regulation is highly
expensive, it is necessary to overcome the efficiency challenges
of coordinating competing uses of inherently public assets.
The waste principle also mediates competing property interests across time in a cost-minimizing fashion. Whereas it has
been said that most legal policies “are skewed toward the present while marginalizing the future,” thus “discounting the
value of future benefits” in favor of the present,277 waste law is
both historically informed and forward looking. It provides
greater deference to future interests—which are presumed to be
longer in duration and more durable—than present interests
when examining uses that may present net utility losses.
Waste’s limitations on common pool uses, both in limited and
open-access commons, are also skewed toward the future, elevating conservation interests above the individual gain of any
user. As such, the waste principle enables governance across
four dimensions—across property boundaries at all depths and
looking forward to the future.
Because of its forward-looking nature, waste also avoids the
pitfall of treating resources as inexhaustible. Waste resists negative-sum changes to land, inherently pricing environmental attributes. It affords value to uncut trees, oil in the ground, water
in streams, and the navigability of lakes and oceans—not because of some intrinsic value, but because of their potential utility to future users. Thus, waste grants future owners entry into
conversations regarding present use of property to constrain present owners from plundering and contaminating the natural resources.278
2. Waste and Liberal Self-Governance
Early statutory regulation of waste and the common law
waste principle mediated private and public rights in common
property in a pragmatic fashion. This approach sits in contrast
with many contemporary theoretical approaches to addressing
commons problems, which tend to prescribe either extensive
277. JAN LAITOS, WHY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES FAIL 3 (2017).
278. See id. at 10 (asserting that economic systems “plunder and contaminate”).
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privatization or “illiberal communitarian solutions” and centralized control.279 Others, like Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller,
have challenged this binary framework and advanced alternative legal reforms that would combine elements of property and
regulation.280 Through the waste principle, the law takes a practical “all of the above” approach. It deploys a wide range of solutions from private to public and everything in between, specifying the mix of private rights and public regulation that defines
any given commons based on its particular qualities.281 In this
way, the waste principle exhibits several aspects of Dagan and
Heller’s concept of a “liberal commons.”282
In Dagan and Heller’s framework, a liberal commons provides for “spheres of individual dominion, democratic self-governance, and cooperation-enhancing exit” and aims at “facilitating trust and cooperation (strengthening social values) and
generating prosperous use (maximizing economic gain).”283 The
waste principle defines the actions that an individual commoner
may take with respect to the common property without seeking
the permission of or offering any justification to fellow commoners. It thus demarcates a sphere of individual autonomy. This
sphere is marked off by the availability of injunctive relief and
damages, which compel communication and cooperation.284 Rather than leave the commoners to “laborious contract for their
own liberal commons or suffer[] under existing background
rules,”285 the waste principle furnishes a basis for public administration to overcome the barriers to cooperation in commons
with numerous unfamiliar owners.
Like a liberal commons, the waste principle proscribes both
overutilization and underinvestment (or free-riding) in the
279. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
549, 551–52 (2001).
280. E.g., id. at 551–53; Rose, supra note 123, at 129.
281. See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000) (discussing the mix of public, common, and private ownership in semicommons).
282. Dagan & Heller, supra note 279, at 553.
283. Id. at 582.
284. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092
(1972) (explaining that property rules require one to negotiate a price with the
owner to remove the entitlement); see also Elinor Ostrom et al., Covenants With
and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 404, 414
(1992) (demonstrating the efficacy of enforceable rules in enabling the self-governance of common pool resources).
285. Dagan & Heller, supra note 276, at 603.
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commons. For example, the principle proscribes underinvestment by prohibiting permissive waste and curtailing appropriative water rights based on the use of highly inefficient means
of diversion or conveyance, both of which may require owners to
take affirmative action. Additionally, the role of waste law in
commons governance is “constrained” in the sense that it aims
only to set a bottom limit for permissible activities within the
common pool. It is also “indispensable” because it provides a necessary check on monopolization and opportunism that can irreparably destroy or undermine a resource’s value. And finally, like
a liberal commons model, the waste principle accounts for both
economic and social goods in defining impermissible, negativesum transactions within the common property. Its hands-off approach is suited to “generating prosperous use (maximizing economic gain),”286 yet it constrains overutilization where economic
gains are outweighed by social losses (to the commoners as well
as the public).
By strengthening the autonomy of individual owners, the
waste principle fosters community self-governance on both a
macroscale and microscale. As Eduardo Peñalver suggests, property also socializes people and binds them together into groups
organized around shared norms, geography, common interests,
and the need for market transactions.287 Thus, property reinforces self-sufficiency as something that must be exercised according to community values and “in service to human existence.”288 The waste principle promotes self-sufficiency of the
property community by minimizing the need for external interactions. For instance, in many oil and gas regulatory proceedings, only members of the community—owners of property
within the immediate vicinity—have a right to participate in
proceedings regarding uses of the property. At a microscale, the
waste principle encourages individual autonomy by permitting
nonwasteful uses without cooperation of other members within
the community. Only where an owner’s use would result in net
losses to the relevant community can that community impose internal discipline. The principle catalyzes the sort of self-governance that Peñalever’s conception of property envisions—a regime that binds individuals together as part of a group of
286. Id. at 582.
287. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1891
(2005).
288. Id.
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common property owners while balancing the demands of freedom and community in support of societal values.289
The waste principle can help “mediate liberty and cooperation” not only within individual commons but also, to an extent,
within the polity at large.290 As Rose has written, property
rights complement economic and political values by diffusing political power, “elucidating people in the patterns of give-and-take
on which democracy depends,” and furnishing a concrete symbol
for property owners of their being rights holders and secure citizens.291 Per Rose, “Democracies require some of the same cultural traits that property and commerce do: respect for the rights
of others, an appeal to voluntary agreement rather than force,
the channeling of self-interest into cooperation for mutual benefit.”292 As Rose explains, however, private property may have a
deleterious effect on political virtues where it leads to unregulated monopolies or other inefficiencies.293 Just as it adjusts to
strike a workable balance between private rights and regulation
to control problems of overutilization and underinvestment, the
waste principle also maximizes the political value of common
property rights. It gives maximum effect to private property
where it is most likely to elucidate traits of civic virtue and selfgovernance, namely when it is solely owned. The principle then
increasingly regulates the exercise of private rights as needed to
avoid monopolization of resources and accompanying political
power in individual hands. In so doing, the waste principle systematically circumscribes common property rights in a manner
that maximizes their positive political effects on a liberal democratic system.
B. Reengaging Common Law Courts in Environmental
and Natural Resources Management
Waste contributes to current understandings of environmental regulation and natural resources management but with
289. Id. at 1961.
290. Dagan & Heller, supra note 276, at 554.
291. Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 691, 700–18 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Privatization]; see also Carol M. Rose,
Property as the Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 329–30 (1996) [hereinafter Rose, Property as the Keystone Right] (discussing the centrality of property
rights in economic, connotational, and political ordering).
292. Rose, Privatization, supra note 291, at 718.
293. Id.
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much greater urgency. Viewed across its various contexts, waste
emerges as a doctrine that is sensitive to evolving norms yet durable in its principles and that reinforces liberal ideals of individual autonomy and self-governance. Combined with its efficient scale and future-looking perspective, these attributes give
waste the capacity to facilitate self-governance in environmental
problem solving. Yet the promise of waste doctrine to resolve environmental problems is largely unrealized. Its underenforcement by common law courts has increasingly left environmental
and natural resource governance to administrative law, which
has caused an astounding proliferation of laws and regulations
without resolving many of the most pressing resource-scale
problems. Nevertheless, a renewed recognition of and respect for
the waste principle could reengage common law courts toward a
more responsive and adaptive system of environmental governance.
1. The Disappearing Common Law Court
As the preceding discussions of waste in land law, oil and
gas law, and water law demonstrate, the common law of waste
was once of much greater importance than today. Today’s waste
law, particularly in the cases of water and oil and gas, is primarily statutory and regulatory law. The common law accordingly
plays a smaller role. So, too, do courts, despite their authority to
enforce statutory and regulatory prohibitions on waste.294 “The
prohibitions against waste,” one scholar observed, “are mostly
hortatory concepts that rarely result in cutbacks in water
use.”295 When petitioned by private parties to curtail waste,
courts hesitate to do so, whether out of concern for potential regulatory takings, lack of jurisdiction, or deference to the political
branches or administrative agencies.
To the extent that courts hesitate to curtail the use of common resources because of the specter of sanctioning a regulatory
taking, the waste principle furnishes a constitutional justification for environmental regulation that is fully consistent with
even a classical liberal approach. Common law prohibitions
294. The lack of serious enforcement, judicial or administrative, of waste provisions has been observed especially in water law, where it has been said that
“[j]udicial sanction of inefficient techniques allows billions of gallons of irrigation
water to be diverted daily from western streams and aquifers without being used
by crops.” Shupe, supra note 8, at 484.
295. Neuman, supra note 116, at 922.
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against waste are inherently limited in ways that, without supplementation by some public regulation, undermine the security
and value of the private rights they exist to protect. First, as the
Supreme Court recognized in the early days of statutory waste
regulation in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, a common pool natural
resource can be irreparably destroyed by any of the owners in an
instant, necessitating ex ante prohibitions to prevent waste from
occurring in the first place.296 Second, commons with large numbers of co-owners are plagued by coordination problems, which
often preclude both development of contractual ex ante regulation and cooperative enforcement through litigation ex post.
Public regulation that simply gives effect to the waste principle
as it exists at common law does no violence to common law rights
(quite the opposite) and is consistent with the narrowest conception of the police power.297
When legislatures or agencies impose regulation that is
more stringent than the background waste doctrine (as they
tend to do when demands on resources grow in intensity), the
constitutional foundation for the regulation moves from the police power to the power to regulate private property for a public
purpose and must be consistent with due process and the Takings Clause.298 Conceptually, however, proper application of the
waste principle to limit the use of shared resources should never
result in a taking. The principle circumscribes the extent of private rights in common resources at common law; its mere enforcement thus does not curtail existing rights but rather protects them from curtailment. Consequently, the Takings Clause
should rarely (if ever) present a real problem for appropriate administrative and judicial enforcement of waste regulations in
water and oil and gas law.
The likelier sources of judicial underenforcement are a lack
of jurisdiction or deference to administrative agencies and the
political branches. Consider a recent case, Vogel v. Marathon Oil
Co., where the court declined to recognize the viability of a common law claim for waste of a common pool of natural gas in light

296. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 201 (1900).
297. E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 107–25 (1985) (extolling such a view of the police power).
298. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (discussing regulatory takings doctrine); e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.,
339 U.S. 725, 752 (1950) (requiring riparians be compensated for their loss of water
to further the state’s reclamation project).
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of a scheme of statutory enactments and regulations.299 Vogel
sued Marathon, which operated the oil and gas lease on Vogel’s
minerals, alleging that Marathon had flared natural gas produced from the lease in violation of North Dakota’s statutory
prohibition on flaring, which required payment of a royalty on
gas flared in excess of the statute.300 She asserted a private right
of action under North Dakota’s statute, as well as common law
claims for conversion and waste.301 The court denied all her
claims, finding that there was no private right of action under
the anti-flaring statute and that the statute preempted her common law waste claim.302 It reasoned that the statute was intended to occupy the field of waste regulation and that it could
not be construed as complementary with the common law of
waste because, unlike the common law, it permitted flaring during the first year of production from a well.303 Thus, the court
resolved the conflict between the common law and the statute in
favor of the laxer waste regulation in the statute.304 Finding
that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the court dismissed Vogel’s suit and permitted Marathon’s
flaring to continue.
2. The Limits of Environmental Regulation
As Vogel demonstrates, the encroachment of statutory
waste regulation into the common law sphere does not uniformly
benefit environmental and natural resource conservation. In addition to abrogating potentially powerful common law claims,
codification and regulation has led to a fragmented and complicated regime of piecemeal regulations that are often unable to
adapt to changing circumstances and can quickly become obsolete. Without common law claims like waste as a meaningful
complement, environmental statutes and regulations are not adequately addressing major resource-scale problems like climate
change.
The waste principle provides a useful counterpoint to contemporary environmental law. The waste principle can manage
problems across an endless variety of commons—from life
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co., 879 N.W.2d 471 (N.D. 2016).
Id. at 474–75.
Id.
Id. at 482–83.
Id.
Id.
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tenancies in small farmsteads to publicly owned submerged
lands—because it is a simple, objective abstraction. It is a neutral, generally applicable concept, as opposed to a set of rigidly
particularized rules or standards designed to address specific
situations. Responding to myriad environmental problems occurring within enormously complex natural systems,305 environmental statutes (like the federal Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts) take a complex but fragmented, inconsistent, and unsystematic approach to internalizing polluters’ negative externalities.306 Treating individual environmental hazards in isolation
and with voluminous and minutely technical regulations helps
drive problems of “regulatory accretion”307 and overaccumulation of laws—the so-called “hyperlexis” phenomenon.308 While
academics have largely ignored it,309 the concern that there are
simply too many particularized laws and regulations has traction among practicing lawyers.310 Whereas the fear of
305. Jan G. Laitos & Lauren Joseph Wolongevicz, Why Environmental Laws
Fail, 39 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 43–44 (2014) (characterizing the
environment as complex and adaptive).
306. See Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM.
J. ENV’T L. 119, 122–23 (2003) (“EPA sets standards on an inconsistent, ad hoc basis.”); Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 203, 203–05 (1999) (noting the lack of integration under the Clean Water Act); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change,
Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 849–69
(2008) (reaching a similar conclusion about the Clean Water Act); Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
219, 219–25, 239–40 (2013) (juxtaposing the “dysfunctions of fragmented regulation” against the integrated complexity of natural systems and science’s increasing
ability to model and map those complexities).
307. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 763, 800–23
(2003) (identifying the phenomenon of regulatory accretion and the resulting regulatory burden).
308. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV.
767 (1977). Contra Mila Sohoni, The Idea of Too Much Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1585, 1586–91, 1622–31 (2012) (critiquing “hyperlexis”).
309. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 307, at 762 n.13. But see, e.g., RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 3 (1995) (discussing the explosion
of federal regulation).
310. E.g., John Freemuth, Environmental Policy Getting Too Dense, 40
ADVOCATE 10, 12 (1997) (“We’ve got too many conflicting laws right now. . . . I can’t
keep up and I write and teach in environmental policy.”); see Jeff Civins, Lender
Concerns Under Environmental Laws, 20 STATE BAR TEX. ENV’T L.J. 93, 93 (1990)
(“[R]egulatory schemes are complex and the definitions and acronyms seem to be
calculated to confuse the regulated community.”); see also Bayless Manning, Too
Much Law: Our National Disease, 33 BUS. LAW. 435 (1977) (critiquing “hyperlexis”);
Edward T. McMahon & Sharon Irish, Too Much Law, 6 UPDATE ON L.-RELATED
EDUC. 7 (1982) (discussing the proliferation of lawsuits and arbitrations); Richard
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irreparable harms leads to enactment of centralized laws and
complex regulation to redress the most immediate environmental threats, the separate and particularized nature of this approach creates the possibility of error and produces laws that
ultimately may not be scalable to address new and diffuse impacts. The fragmented and inflexible approach of modern environmental regulation may also contribute to the problem of statutory “obsolescence.”311 As circumstances change and
technologies evolve, courts and bureaucrats encounter difficulty
filling the gaps left behind by outdated statutes. The literature
on this problem, dating back to Pound and Cardozo, has grown
increasingly skeptical in the current era of “unprecedented congressional paralysis” and new environmental challenges like climate change, which existing statutes simply do not address.312
The waste principle, in contrast, has been with us much
longer than any federal environmental law yet has never truly
fallen into obsolescence. By taking into consideration changing
information and community standards of good husbandry, the
waste principle is inherently adaptable to new challenges and
changing human and natural circumstances. Unlike statutory
environmental laws that elevate one value (be it limiting emissions or preserving historic property), waste doctrine empowers
courts to consider numerous competing private and public values to assess how property use shifts welfare. It thereby serves
as a counterpoint to the contemporary mode of environmental
lawmaking. And it may have significant normative power for designing an effective, adaptive, and simpler regulatory approach
to greenhouse gas emissions, as well as any number of other environmental problems that are not addressed by an existing statutory scheme.

Thigpen, Hyperlexis: The Problem of Too Much Law, 39 ALA. LAW. 411 (1978) (addressing newly licensed attorneys on the growing problem of hyperlexis).
311. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987).
312. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2014); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES 33 (1982); Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 113, 114 (1921); Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—Judges Who
Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 792 (1963); Roscoe Pound,
Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 142, 144 (1920)).
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C. Reengaging Waste and Common Law Courts to Address
Contemporary Environmental Problems
There are several live, on-the-ground environmental and
natural resources management issues for which the waste principle presents new and helpful ways of thinking about the problem and offers possible concrete legal solutions. Applying the
waste principle as a standard that is inherent within the common law and independent of the limits of its various specific iterations in doctrine reveals its potential as a forward-looking
mechanism to resolve contemporary environmental problems.
1. Applying the Public-Trust Doctrine to the
Atmosphere
As statutory and regulatory efforts to address greenhouse
gas emissions head-on are stalled and stymied by politics and
bureaucratic delay, environmental advocates have increasingly
turned to the courts to find redress for climate harms under the
public-trust doctrine. These efforts have largely failed for reasons relating to the murkiness of the doctrine’s scope, substantive requirements, and justiciability as applied to the atmosphere. The study of waste sheds new light on each of these
issues.
As discussed in Part IV, the need for the public-trust doctrine springs from the very set of conditions that necessitate
waste doctrine in private law—collective ownership of common
resources. And its bare-minimum requirements are the same as
private waste law: private uses of public trust resources are permitted only if they generate more gains than public losses. Recognizing that the public-trust doctrine is simply a public-law analog of the private law of waste may lend clarity and substance
to both fields.
Three aspects of the public-trust doctrine’s scope and justiciability may be clearer when understood in the broader context
of the waste principle. First, litigants in so-called “atmospheric
trust” cases have struggled to persuade courts to apply the public-trust doctrine to the atmosphere,313 yet the atmosphere
would clearly be subject to the waste principle as articulated
313. E.g., Chernaik v. Brown, 475 P.3d 68, 72, 83–84 (Or. 2020) (declining to
extend the doctrine, which it holds only “encompasses submerged and submersible
lands underlying navigable waters and the navigable waters themselves”).
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here, as it is subject to the concurrent and successive use claims
of multiple individuals. Second, a split is developing among state
courts on the question of whether the public-trust doctrine
sounds in traditional property principles of trust law or is a narrower, sui generis public-law doctrine. On one side, there are
courts that consider the government’s trust responsibilities over
public natural resources to mirror the responsibilities of a trustee under private-law concepts, including that the government
must act as fiduciary of the public in dealing with the corpus of
the public trust.314 On the other side of the split are courts that
reject the position that the state has the same fiduciary duties
over publicly held natural resources as the trustee of a common
law private trust would have.315 Viewed as part of a system of
common property management that is undergirded by the waste
principle, the public-trust doctrine clearly emerges as an extension of private-law concepts. The opposing position confuses the
connection between public and private property law and undermines the system of liberal governance the waste principle helps
to structure.
Third, and finally, courts have denied relief to atmospheric
public trust claimants on the grounds that such claims are not
redressable by courts and, thus, not justiciable.316 Here again,
the waste principle may supply a more productive way of thinking about the public-trust doctrine. Courts generally have no
trouble remedying violations of the waste principle at common
law. Rather than involve themselves in the messy business of
prescribing uses and allocations of common resources, courts in
private common law waste cases usually award money damages
or enjoin ongoing wasteful conduct. The details of the resolution—how the parties subsequently go about sharing the resource—are left to the parties’ own decision-making. Only in
rare circumstances, such as claims of economic waste of shared
oil and gas resources, do courts find the difficulty of fashioning

314. Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 932–35 (Pa. 2017);
accord State v. Mathis, 223 P.3d 1119, 1122–24 (Utah 2009) (holding that the
state’s public-trust responsibilities for state school lands include the “fiduciary obligations of a trustee”).
315. E.g., Chernaik, 475 P.3d at 72.
316. E.g., Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1169–74 (9th Cir. 2020)
(citing Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019)) (finding plaintiffs’
claims nonjusticiable because “there was no ‘limited and precise’ standard discernable” for redressing the asserted violation).
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a remedy for alleged waste to be disqualifying.317 The onus of
translating these principles to the context of an atmospheric
trust claim rests on claimants, who should take instruction from
private waste cases in how to articulate their prayer for relief,
as well as on courts, which may find private waste remedies to
be a useful analogy in redressing atmospheric trust claims.
2. Controlling Natural Gas Venting and Flaring
Another contemporary problem¾uncontrolled venting and
flaring of natural gas¾implicates governance of the atmosphere
as well as common pools of natural gas. Around the world, but
in the United States in particular, oil and gas producers vent
and flare immense and unprecedented quantities of natural
gas.318 Venting releases the natural gas, comprised in its dry
state of methane, directly into the atmosphere, while flaring
combusts the gas and emits carbon dioxide.319 The climate impact of these methane and carbon dioxide emissions is significant.320 In addition to causing these greenhouse gas emissions,
venting and flaring dissipate billions of cubic feet of natural gas
from common reservoirs every year. The potential value of these
reserves is itself enormous: by one estimate, the volume of gas
vented and flared annually in the United States would power
over six million homes for an entire year.321
The results of venting and flaring—loss of reserves and massive greenhouse gas emissions—are obviously problematic, yet
the activity largely falls outside the reach of federal environmental laws. Recent attempts to stretch the Clean Air Act to address
methane emissions from oil and gas operations demonstrate the
problem of statutory obsolescence and the challenges of relying
317. See supra Section III.B.1.
318. See Kim Talus & Cheri R. Hasz, Economic Waste and Environmental
Problems: Natural Gas Flaring in Texas, in DECARBONISATION AND THE ENERGY
INDUSTRY: LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION IN LOW-CARBON ENERGY MARKETS 107
(Tade Oyewunmi et al. eds., 2020).
319. 8 MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 134 (definition of “venting” and “flaring”).
320. See New Analysis Reveals Persistent Methane Problem, ENV’T DEF. FUND:
N.M. OIL & GAS DATA, https://www.edf.org/nm-oil-gas [https://perma.cc/U8HJ69NV].
321. Mark Agerton et al., Rice Univ.’s Baker Inst. for Pub. Pol’y, The Economics of Natural Gas Flaring in U.S. Shale: An Agenda for Research and Policy 2–3
(July 24, 2020) (unpublished working paper), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/03160f6a/ces-agerton-etal-naturalgas-072420.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QV6S-C5JY].
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on the political branches to address new problems through lawmaking and rulemaking. In 2016, the Obama Administration
EPA promulgated New Source Performance Standards for methane emissions from newly constructed oil and natural gas
wells and pipelines.322 Four years later, the Trump Administration EPA rolled back much of the substance of these restrictions.323 Then, less than a year later, the most drastic provisions of these rollbacks were “disapproved” by a joint
resolution of Congress under the Congressional Review Act and
deemed never to have taken effect.324 Similarly, efforts by the
Department of the Interior to extend its land management regulations to the practice through the Methane Reduction Rule
were overturned because the principal purpose of the rule, regulation of GHG emissions, was found to be outside the agency’s
authority.325 The endless seesaw of federal regulatory change
has left venting and flaring to be regulated by state conservation
agencies based on state statutes that generally prohibit the
waste of natural gas, but which rarely authorize consideration
of cumulative atmospheric impacts.
Administrative management of the cumulative impacts of
venting and flaring as waste is difficult, however, because much
venting and flaring is not purposeless.326 It is done during the
normal course of drilling and repair operations and is often necessary to release pressure and avoid emergencies. The latest rise
in venting and flaring is thanks to the rapid development of new
shale plays where pipeline infrastructure to take natural gas
from the wellhead to market has yet to be constructed.327 In
these plays, oil producers often lack a place to go with the associated natural gas, leading them to either vent, flare, or shut in
their producing oil wells. In light of the need for some venting
and flaring, many oil and gas producing states, like Texas, have
taken a lax approach to regulating the practice.328 In contrast,
New Mexico recently adopted regulations to virtually eliminate

322. 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.5360a–60.5439a (2020) (“Subpart OOOOa”).
323. 85 Fed. Reg. 57,018 (Sept. 14, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60); 85
Fed. Reg. 57,398 (Sept. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60).
324. S.J. Res. 14, 117th Cong. (2021).
325. State v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (D. Wyo. 2020).
326. See Joseph A. Schremmer, Regulating Natural Gas Venting and Flaring
as Waste: A Review of the New Mexico Approach, OIL GAS & ENERGY L. (2022),
https://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=4018 [https://perma.cc/WRJ3-2TCH].
327. Id.
328. Talus & Hasz, supra note 318.
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all routine venting and flaring.329 The all-or-nothing approach
of state regulators threatens to sanction significant greenhouse
gas emissions and loss of resources, on the one hand, or curtail
legal and necessary uses of hydrocarbon reserves, on the
other.330
A more nuanced approach is needed to balance the costs and
benefits of venting and flaring. That approach is the waste principle. Where regulations permit venting and flaring that wastes
natural gas reserves, waste doctrine may provide an avenue for
a judicial remedy to address the costs and benefits of such operations. The waste doctrine empowers courts to provide other reservoir owners with damages for wasted gas, to enjoin venting
and flaring in violation of the principle, or to overturn agency
flaring authorizations that violate statutory prohibitions on
waste, thus compelling regulatory agencies to consider how
venting and flaring limitations could be drafted to reflect the
net-welfare standard implicit in the waste principle.
3. Remedying Unregulated Pollution
A third contemporary problem facing environmental law,
how to address pollutants for which no specific regulation exists,
owes its existence to the larger issue of statutory obsolescence.
The leading example of problematic unregulated pollutants are
per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). These chemicals
are used in a diverse array of commercial and household products like food packaging and Teflon.331 PFAS are persistent in
the environment, particularly in soil and groundwater, meaning
they accumulate and do not break down.332 Moreover, PFAS contamination has been linked to increased cholesterol, low infant
birth weights, immunological problems, and even cancer.333
Concerns about the health impacts of PFAS have been
329. Schremmer, supra note 326.
330. Id. (illustrating how New Mexico’s elimination of venting and flaring violates the waste principle as applied to certain uses of venting and flaring).
331. Basic Information on PFAS, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pfas/basic-information-pfas [https://perma.cc/JB24-F72M].
332. Id. In addition to exposure through consumer products, environmental
contamination principally results from disposal of PFAS waste streams, which
move contaminants into the environment either in the air through incineration or
into the soil and water through wastewater treatment or landfilling. Tasha Stoiber
et al., Disposal of Products and Materials Containing Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS): A Cyclical Problem, 260 CHEMOSPHERE 127659 (2020).
333. Basic Information on PFAS, supra note 331.
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documented for at least twenty years. Since then, the EPA has
acted to regulate PFAS based on its authority in the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).334 Since 2002, it has promulgated several
Significant New Use Rules to limit and monitor new contamination; initiated the process for listing certain PFAS as CERCLA
hazardous substances; promulgated new rules of disposal of
PFAS waste streams; and taken other actions to identify, prevent, and remediate PFAS contamination.335 In October 2021,
the EPA announced a “PFAS Strategic Roadmap” setting forth
a plan for future policy- and rulemaking.336 Although these actions have begun the process of regulating PFAS, they have also
demonstrated the lag between emergence of new environmental
issues and development and amendment of comprehensive statutory and regulatory programs.
The waste principle represents a ready means for courts to
step into the breach. Well before the EPA developed new rules,
common law courts applying the waste principal could have
acted to enjoin contamination that violated the waste principle
or compensated injured plaintiffs in damages. Advocates for
owners of contaminated groundwater aquifers, for instance,
could pursue a claim for waste against another owner in the common aquifer who caused a discharge of PFAS into the aquifer.
The plaintiff would need to show that the defendant’s use of the
common aquifer failed to produce a legitimate benefit to offset
the harm it caused to the plaintiff’s (and other owners’) loss of
the ability to use the resource safely. Given that releasing PFAS
into a common aquifer could render the entire resource unusable
by the other owners, the defendant’s actions may well amount to
an impermissible monopoly of the aquifer. A waste claim of this
nature could supplement more familiar types of claims, such as
nuisance or negligence, and could avoid some of the practical and
procedural difficulties in bringing a nuisance claim.
334. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA 823R18004, EPA’S PER- AND
POLYFLUOROALKYL
SUBSTANCES
(PFAS)
ACTION
PLAN
(2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2019-02/documents/pfas_action_plan_0213
19_508compliant_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y386-ZSBF].
335. Id.
336. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA-100-K-21-002, PFAS STRATEGIC ROADMAP:
EPA’S COMMITMENTS TO ACTION 2021–2024 (2021), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-10/pfas-roadmap_final-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7APVGKX].
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Additionally, the waste principle may support a claim under the
public-trust doctrine against the state water administrator for
permitting the polluter to use a common aquifer in a wasteful
manner.
D. Waste’s Proper Role
Despite its numerous potential contributions, the waste
principle is not a panacea for contemporary environmental and
commons-management problems. Even though waste skews toward future interests, as a common law doctrine, its mechanism
is gradual and incremental. Moreover, waste doctrine only prevents subtractive harms; it does not impose a duty to improve
property. As a result, waste alone may not keep up with disruptive and rapidly compounding challenges like climate change.
Although norms may evolve and courts and agencies may eventually update waste to consider resource-scale impacts—such as
climate change, species extinction, and aquifer depletion—it
may come too late to avoid serious degradation. Consequently,
just as historic-preservation laws supplement common law limitations on destruction of property to protect the public interests
of non-owners, waste should be viewed as operating in conjunction with, rather than as an alternative to, the essential constraints on uses of common property within modern environmental laws. In formulating such statutory and regulatory
provisions, drafters would be wise to adopt an approach consistent with the adaptive, flexible framework provided by the
waste principle, which is already utilized in many existing oil
and gas conservation acts and water codes.337 Conversely, where
agencies and legislatures are unresponsive to emerging and escalating environment problems, courts should enthusiastically
reengage with the doctrine of waste to remedy and prevent subtractive harms.
Important though it is, centralized regulation ought to be a
last resort in governing commons problems, to be utilized only
where decentralized judicial enforcement of the common law of
waste is not practicable. Yet waste doctrines are largely underenforced, although this Article details many examples where
courts enforced the common law of waste to prevent subtractive

337. See supra Sections III.A.2 & III.B.2.
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uses of common property.338 Understanding the waste principle
as an inherent limitation on title to commonly held property, as
well as an integral component of a longstanding system of decentralized liberal governance of shared resources, may reassure
lawyers and judges otherwise reticent to employ a seemingly obscure or ancient doctrine. In any case, more consistent use of the
waste principle by lawyers and judges is needed to effectuate a
simpler and more liberal system of regulation of public and private property.
CONCLUSION
Far from an obscure artifact of first-year property class,
waste law, when properly understood, forms a vital part of a forward-looking, decentralized, durable, and adaptive framework
for integrating public and private interests in commons resources. The waste principle offers a fresh perspective on leading
theories of property law, as well as an antidote to contemporary
resource-scale environmental problems. As such, environmental
scholars and advocates should embrace waste doctrines as the
embodiment of the waste principle, which is inextricable from
environmental governance. Likewise, courts ought to seek to
consistently enforce the waste principle as an inherent limitation on title to common property, and legislators should respect
the principle as a foundational component of a simple, liberal,
and pragmatic system when evaluating and drafting statutory
changes to the common law.

338. See generally Neuman, supra note 116 (comprehensively critiquing the
failure of enforcement of the beneficial-use doctrine, embodying the waste principle,
in western water law).

